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The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a vital 
component of our nation's defense that is called upon daily to accomplish a wide 
variety of unique and challenging missions throughout the world. A critical 
element of USSOCOM's success is its ability to acquire the finest equipment 
available to achieve these missions. This research analyzes USSOCOM's 
acquisition process to determine its level of success at delivering this equipment, 
and focuses primarily on its ability to incorporate acquisition reform initiatives of 
the past decade into the process. In developing this analysis, the following areas 
are discussed: the roles and missions of USSOCOM, acquisition reform initiatives 
of the past decade beginning with the Packard Commission, the findings and 
recommendations of the USSOCOM Acquisition Process Action Team Report and 
the acquisition process at USSOCOM. 
Based on the research conducted, it is clear that, overall, USSOCOM has done 
a superb job incorporating reform initiatives into its acquisition process. Areas 
determined to be non-compliant relate primarily to the concept of empowerment of 
the Program Executive Officers (PEO). Recommendations for correcting these 
weaknesses include giving PEOs the authority to execute reprogramming and 
realignment in accordance with established legal thresholds. 
v 
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The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a vital 
component of our nation's defense that is called upon daily to accomplish a wide variety 
of unique and challenging missions throughout the world. A critical element of 
USSOCOM's success is its ability to acquire the finest equipment available to achieve 
these missions. This research analyzes USSOCOM's acquisition process to determine its 
level of success at delivering this equipment, and focuses primarily on its ability to 
incorporate acquisition reform initiatives of the past decade into the process. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
Do USSOCOM acquisition procedures comply with the intent of reform 
initiatives of the past decade? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a) What are the findings, recommendations and requirements of the 
acquisition reform initiatives of the past decade, including the Packard Commission, 
Defense Management Review (DMR), Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DA WIA), National Performance Review (NPR), Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
(F ASA), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Acquisition Process Action Team (A-
PAT) Report, Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA) and Best Value Contracting? 
b) What were the principal recommendations of the USSOCOM A-
PAT Report? 
c) Are the recommendations of the USSOCOM A-PAT Report being 
implemented effectively? 
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d) Are the findings and recommendations of the OSD and 
USSOCOM A-PAT Reports similar? If not, identify the differences. 
e) IfUSSOCOM is not fully complying with the intent of acquisition 
reform, what changes should be made to the acquisition process to implement reform 
initiatives? 
C. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This study is being conducted to determine the extent of USSOCOM's 
compliance with acquisition reform initiatives of the past decade by reviewing the 
findings, recommendations and requirements of the Packard Commission, DMR, 
DAWIA, National Performance Review, FASA, OSD A-PAT Report and FARA as well 
as providing information on the updated DoD 5000 series, "Best Value" contracting and 
the Single Process Initiative. 
In formulating a determination of USSOCOM' s compliance, key features of the 
acquisition reform initiatives listed in the previous paragraph and USSOCOM's A-PAT 
Report will be listed and discussed, and USSOCOM's acquisition process from the 
generation of a Mission Need Statement through each of a programs milestone's will be 
reviewed. 
The duties and responsibilities of the different organizations and individuals 
associated with the acquisition process will also be discussed, including the Special 
Operations Acquisition Center (SOAC), Military Deputy to the Acquisition Executive 
(MDAE), Special Operations Acquisition Executive (SOAE), Program Executive 
Officers (PEOs ), Program Managers (PMs ), System Acquisition Managers (SAMs ), 
USSOCOM's Directorates and the Special Operations Components. The thesis will also 
discuss the criteria USSOCOM utilizes for determining if an acquisition program will be 
managed "in-house" or by one of the Services. 
This in-depth look at the acquisition process will provide the means necessary to 
determine ifUSSOCOM is incorporating acquisition reform initiatives into its acquisition 
2 
process and to provide opinions and recommendations on USSOCOM policies that are 
not consistent with the intent of acquisition reform. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. Data Gathering 
1bis research was accomplished by reviewing literature associated with 
acquisition reform initiatives, USSOCOM acquisition directives and the USSOCOM A-
pAT Report. 1bis information summarizes the changes that have occurred in Defense 
acquisition in the past decade and was used to evaluate the acquisition procedures in 
place at USSOCOM today. A substantial amount of information was also gathered by 
conducting interviews with individuals associated with USSOCOM's acquisition process, 
including members of the SOAC, headquarters directorates and the Components. 
2. Analysis and Recommendations 
Analysis is included in the primary and secondary research question responses, 
focusing on how well USSOCOM's acquisition process complies with the intent of 
acquisition reform initiatives. Recommendations are provided for those areas of the 
acquisition process that do not comply with the intent of acquisition reform. 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The chapter outline is as follows: 
• Chapter I: Introduction-Discusses the objective of this research, the 
research questions, the chapter outline and the expected benefits of the study. 
• Chapter II: USSOCOM Information--Discusses the roles and missions of 
USSOCOM and SOAC and provides USSOCOM's annual budget. 
• Chapter III: Acquisition Reform Initiatives-Presents reform initiatives of 
the past decade from the Packard Commission until the present. 
• Chapter IV: USSOCOM Acquisition PAT Report--Reviews USSOCOM's 
A-PAT Report, including the findings, recommendations and procedures for 
implementing the changes into USSOCOM's acquisition process. 
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• Chapter V: USSOCOM's Acquisition Process--This chapter describes the 
current acquisition process at USSOCOM, including the roles and 
responsibilities of key individuals and organizations involved in the process. 
• Chapter VI: Analysis and Recommendations--Responses to the primary 
and secondary research questions form the basis of the analysis and 
recommendations included in this chapter. 
F. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This thesis provides an objective view of the acquisition process at USSOCOM 
based on the research conducted. It highlights where USSOCOM is highly successful 
implementing acquisition reform initiatives and also discusses those areas that are 
determined by the author to be non-compliant with the intent of acquisition reform. The 
findings and recommendations contained herein can be reviewed by key personnel 
involved in the acquisition process and implemented if they believe the 
recommendations will improve USSOCOM's acquisition process. 
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II. UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND INFORMATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is one of nine 
unified commands in the U.S. military's combatant command structure and is the 
centerpiece of an effort by Congress in the mid-1980's to improve the ability of the 
United States to conduct special military operations. Activated on April 16, 1987, 
USSOCOM is responsible for training, equipping and maintaining approximately 47,000 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) in a ready state of support of the contingency plans 
developed by the five geographically oriented unified commands (USEUCOM, 
USCENTCOM, USP ACOM, USA COM, and USSOUTHCOM). The legislation which 
activated USSOCOM also created the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) [ASD (SOILIC)] and a separate major force 
program for special operations (MFP-11 ).1 
The creation of USSOCOM, headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, 
Florida, rectified a gap that had existed in the method used to equip special operations 
forces. USSOCOM has both combat and material development proponency for "Special 
Operations (SO) -peculiar" items used by its assigned forces, and budget responsibility 
for Research, Development, Technology and Evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement of 
such items. The period 1987-92 was designated as the "crosswalk" phase to transfer these 
functions and budgets from the Services to USSOCOM. In FY 92, USSOCOM assumed 
full Program Objective Memorandum (POM) responsibility for the acquisition of SOF 
peculiar items? 
The remainder of this chapter will describe the organization ofUSSOCOM forces, 
present USSOCOM's budget and describe the Special Operations Acquisition Center 
(SOAC). 
1 Douglas W. Lessley, Special Operations and the Soldier System: Critical Acquisition Issues, Masters 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1992, pp. 75-76. 
2 Ibid., p. 76. 
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Figure 2.1: U.S. SOF Organization (USSOF 1996 Posture Statement, p. 33) 
B. ORGANIZATION 
The Commander in Chief of USSOCOM (USCINCSOC) is a four star General 
Officer with two distinct roles. In his capacity as a supporting CINC, he provides trained 
and ready SOF to the geographic CINCs. In his role as a supported CINC, the 
USCINCSOC must be prepared to exercise command of selected special operations 
missions when directed by the National Command Authorities.3 USSOCOM's four 
component commands, United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC), 
Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECW ARCOM), Air Force Special 
Operations Command (AFSOC) and Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), are 
represented in Figure 2.1. 
3 United States Special Operations Forces 1996 Posture Statement, p. 1. 
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The geographic CINCs are responsible for determining the forces necessary to 
accomplish the missions within their areas of responsibility. Their requirements provide 
the guidance used to develop capabilities and structure of SOF, which consists of four 
Component commands and various theater assets which are vital to the geographic 
CINCs. 41 
1. Component Commands 
a) U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) 
Headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, USASOC is responsible to 
USSOCOM for the readiness of Ranger, Special Forces, special operations aviation, civil 
affairs and psychological operations units.5 
b) Naval Special Watfare Command (NAVSPECW ARCOM) 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) forces are organized to support naval and 
joint special operations within the theater unified command. Located in Coronado, 
California, NA VSPECW ARC OM is responsible to USSOCOM for the readiness of those 
NSW forces, which include sea-air-land (SEAL) teams, SEAL delivery vehicle teams, 
and special boat squadrons and units.6 
c) U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 
AFSOC, located at Hurlburt Field, Florida, is composed of three special 
operations wings, two special operations groups and a special tactics group. AFSOC is 
responsible to USSOCOM for the readiness of those organizations.7 
d) Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) 
JSOC is a joint headquarters designed to study special operations 
requirements and techniques. Established in 1980, it is located at Fort Bragg, North 
4 Ibid., p. 2. 





Carolina, and is the standing joint special operations task force responsible for missions 
planning, training, tactics and equipment development. 8 
2. Theater Assets 
a) Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) 
These commands serve as the geographic CINCs' sources of expertise in 
all areas of special operations. They normally exercise operational control of SOF (except 
civil affairs and psychological operations) within each geographic CINCs area of 
responsibility. Although USCINCSOC provides funding and personnel for the TSOCs, 
each SOC commander reports to the geographic CINC. 9 
b) Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) 
Support to Geographic CINCs 
CA and PSYOP are SOF principal missions. USSOCOM provides forward 
deployed CA and PSYOP support to the geographic CINCs to accomplish planning and 
coordination for forward presence, peacetime support, contingency and wartime 
operations. Currently, SOF's only PSYOP group in the active component force structure 
is the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne ). 10 
C. BUDGET 
Although SOF requires only 1.3 percent of DoD's budget and represents 1.4 
percent of the military manpower, it provides the National Command Authorities a highly 
trained, rapidly deployable force capable of supporting national military objectives 
throughout the world. 11 
The SOF budget request for FY 97 was approximately $3.06 billion, a $180 
million reduction from the FY 96 budget. Of the five appropriations that make up the 
budget, only MILPERS funding increased. The remaining portions of the budget each 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p. 4. 
11 Ibid., pp. Foreword and p. 1. 
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decreased with the largest percentage and actual dollar reduction occumng in the 
Procurement appropriation. Table 2-1 presents SOF Budget figures for FY 96 and FY 97. 
Appropriation FY96 FY97 
MILPERS* $1,338.6 $1,382.8 
O&M 1,078.0 1,053.0 
Procurement 613.0 454.3 
RDT&E 147.8 122.4 
MILCON 60.5 45.0 
Totals $3,237.9 $3,057.5 
* Funded in the MILPERS accounts of the Military Departments 
Table 2-1: SOF Budget ($Million)(USSOF 1996 Posture Statement, p. 71) 
1. MILPERS 
Funding for military personnel represents the largest portion of the budget, 
requiring approximately $1.4 billion (46%) of the amount requested for FY 97. 
MILPERS covers the pay account requirements for all active duty, reserve and National 
Guard included in USSOCOM's manpower strength, which increased from 46,397 in FY 
96 to 46,511 in FY 97. This funding request represents an increase of approximately $45 
million over FY 96.12 
2. O&M 
The Operations & Maintenance portion of the budget includes civilian pay, 
services for maintenance of equipment, real property and facilities, fuel, consumable 
supplies, spares and repair parts for weapons and equipment. 
The O&M budget is broken down into three budget activities; Operating Forces, 
Training and Administrative (see Table 2-2). The Administrative portion of the O&M 
budget (BA 4) provides resources for operation and maintenance costs to support SOF 
12 Ibid., p. 71. 
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peculiar acquisition programs being developed or procured. The funding is executed by 
the Special Operations Acquisition Center (SOAC) and includes funding for civilian 
program management and general contract support for SOAC to include support 
equipment, facilities, SOAC civilians and associated SOAC management costs. It also 
funds acquisition program management, engineering and logistical support for SOF 
tactical evaluation acquisition programs. 13 
Budget Activity FY96 FY97 
Operating Forces $1,005.2 $962.3 
Training 32.1 35.5 
Administrative 40.7 55.2 
Totals $1,078.0 $1,053.0 
Table 2-2: O&M Budget ($Million)(USSOF 1996 Posture Statement, p. 71) 
3. Procurement 
The FY 97 Procurement budget (see Table 2-3) allocates funds for mobility, 
ammunition, communications, intelligence and miscellaneous programs. Mobility 
programs include funds for completion of major aircraft programs such as the C-130 
Modification Program, and maritime procurement programs such as the MARK V 
Special Operations Craft (SOC) and the MK 8 MOD 1 Seal Delivery Vehicle (SDV). The 
ammunition budget is used to procure munitions for training, operations and war reserve 
stocks and is broken down into two programs; Ordnance Acquisition and Ordnance 
Replenishment. Communications programs develop and procure unique SOF command, 
control and communications (C3) equipment. Examples of communications programs 
include the SOF Tactical Assured Connectivity System (SOFTACS) and the Special 
Mission Radio System. Intelligence programs deliver systems that ensure effective, 
timely processing and distribution of intelligence data to deployed SOF. This portion of 
13 Ibid., p. 72. 
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the budget includes enhancements to the SOCRATES intelligence support system and 
procurement of the SOF Intelligence Vehicle. Items funded under the miscellaneous 
portion of the procurement budget include Small Arms and Weapons, Psychological 
Operations (PSYOP) equipment and the SOF Planning and Rehearsal System 
(SOFP ARS). 14 
Program FY96 FY97 
Mobility $322.5 $232.8 
Ammunition 62.3 30.5 
Communications 33.3 26.6 
Intelligence 25.7 19.8 
Miscellaneous 169.1 144.5 
Totals $613.0 $454.3 
Table 2-3: Procurement ($Million)(USSOF 1996 Posture Statement, p. 72) 
4. RDT&E 
The FY 97 Research, Development, Test and Evaluation budget (see Table 2-4, 
next page) will be used primarily to improve current systems, components and 
subsystems utilized by SOF. The majority of the RDT &E funding is directed towards the 
Tactical Systems Development Program which develops and tests selected specialized 
equipment to meet SOP-unique requirements. Projects currently receiving RDT&E 
funding include the Aviation Advanced Systems Development Project, the Surface Craft 
Advanced Development Project and the Aircraft Defensive Systems Project.15 
5. MILCON 
The purpose of the MILCON budget is to provide both new and replacement 
facilities for SOF. Significant facilities in the FY 97 MILCON budget include the SOF 
14 Ibid., pp. 72-76. 
IS Ibid., p. 76. 
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Advanced SEAL Delivery System Facility at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and the SOF 
Company Operations and Supply Complex at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.16 
Program FY96 FY97 
Tech Base Development $4.0 $4.1 
Adv. Tech Development 15.1 7.9 
Intelligence Systems 2.8 1.3 
Medical Technology 1.8 1.9 
SOF Enhancements 16.2 23.2 
Tactical Sys. Development 107.9 83.9 
Totals $147.8 $122.4 
Table 2-4: RDT &E ($Million)(USSOF 1996 Posture Statement, p. 76) 
D. SPECIAL OPERATIONS ACQUISITION CENTER (SOAC) 
Title 10 United States Code (USC), Sec 167 provides USCINCSOC with Head of 
Agency acquisition authority and responsibility to develop and acquire special operations 
peculiar equipment for forces assigned to USSOCOM, and SOF assigned to unified 
combatant commands other than USSOCOM. It also designates him as the Senior 
Procurement Executive (SPE) for USSOCOM. USCINCSOC appointed a full-time 
USSOCOM Acquisition Executive (SOAE) who has authority, responsibility and 
accountability for all acquisition management functions and materiel programs within 
USSOCOM. In addition, the SOAE is delegated all allowable Head of Agency and Head 
of Contracting authority as the SPE. The SOAC, which is directed by the SOAE, serves 
as USSOCOM' s focal point for all SO acquisition policies, procedures, activities, 
programs, projects and information. 
The SOAC manages approximately one hundred fifteen acquisition programs and 
over 85 designated procurement efforts, technology development projects and phase 0 
studies. The management of these programs requires SOAC to interface with numerous 
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Figure 2.2: SOAC Organizational Chart (USSOCOM Directive 70-1, App B-1) 
stakeholders, including the Congress, DoD, the Joint Staff, the Services and industry on a 
daily basis. The organization, as displayed in Figure 2-2, is broken down into the RD&A 
Directorate, the Procurement Directorate and four PEOs which are aligned to report 
directly to the SOAE. 
1. Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A) Directorate 
The RD&A directorate is directed by the Military Director to the Acquisition 
Executive (MDAE). This component serves as an internal RD&A management support 
organization which provides expertise to the SOAE, PEOs, PMs and Systems Acquisition 
Managers (SAMs) for USSOCOM SO-peculiar programs.17 It is broken down into the 
four functional divisions listed below: 
a) Financial Analysis and Program Integration Division 
This division is responsible for financial management within the SOAC. 
As such, it is closely involved throughout all phases of the acquisition process for all 
USSOCOM and Service-managed programs. Some of the responsibilities of this division 
are to: 
• Manage the SOAC operating budget. 
• Provide instructions and assist PEOs, PMs and SAMs with Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM) development and budget formulation 
documentation. 
• Analyze acquisition POM input and budget submissions for fiscal 
executability. Consolidate RDT &E, Procurement and O&M narratives, 
exhibits and related documentation from USSOCOM and Service PMs to 
form the acquisition input and provide to J8 for the POM process and budget 
submissions. 
• Advise the SOAE, as appropriate, of the fiscal aspects of realignment and 
reprogramming of funds within the limits authorized by Congress. 
17 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, USSOCOM Acquisition Management Procedures, DRAFT, (23 September 
1996), p. 18. 
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• Lead the effort of ensuring that Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV) is 
incorporated in USSOCOM programs.18 
b) Management Operations Division 
This division is the administrative arm of the SOAC. Responsibilities 
include: 
• Managing acquisition related training quotas and requirements and serving as 
the DA WIA (Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act) focal point 
for the command. 
• Providing facility, equipment and supply management for the SOAC.19 
c) Acquisition Policy and Logistics Division 
As the acquisition policy makers within USSOCOM, this division is most 
closely tied to ensuring acquisition reform initiatives are a part of the acquisition process 
at USSOCOM. Specific responsibilities include: 
• Functioning as the USSOCOM focal point on the Integrated Product Team 
(IPT) process. 
• Functioning as the Executive Secretariat for all SOABs (Special Operations 
Acquisition Boards) and EPRs (Executive Program Reviews) for USSOCOM 
managed programs and for preparing the final Acquisition Decision 
Memorandum (ADM) for the USSOCOM MD A. 
• Establishing USSOCOM acquisition directives, policies and procedures. 
• Reviewing ILSPs (Integrated Logistics Support Plans) and program related 
milestone documentation for compliance with DoD and USSOCOM 
acquisition policy for Service or agency-managed programs. 
• Establishing USSOCOM policies for acquisition logistics and forming a 
LRG (Logistics Review Group) with appropriate members from USSOCOM 
18 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
19 Ibid., p. 19. 
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and other agencies to assess, verify and report on the ILS for SO-peculiar 
items. 
• Providing test support for USSOCOM and Service-managed programs. 
• Providing staff membership to support the SOJS/7 Requirements IPT (R-IPT), 
and upon transition to the SOAE, the Program IPT (P-IPT)?0 
d) Advanced Concepts and Engineering Division 
This division is involved in developing long range technical planning for 
USSOCOM. It interacts closely with Service and other agencies' laboratory and research, 
development and engineering centers and provides technology and engineering expertise 
for the SOAE. Responsibilities include: 
• Managing, overseeing and executing technology programs. 
• Developing transition strategies and briefing the Military Deputy to the 
Acquisition Executive (MDAE) and appropriate PEO, SOJ4 (Logistics) or 
other agency, for permission to hand off the project to acquisition or 
procurement. 21 
2. Procurement Directorate 
The Procurement Directorate is responsible for developing, disseminating and 
implementing plans, policies and procedures relating to SOF procurements. This 
organization solicits, negotiates and awards contracts and performs contract 
administration.22 It is organized as follows: 
a) Headquarters Procurement Division 
This division has four branches and is the primary SOF contracting 
organization, responsible for executing USSOCOM contracts for weapon systems, 
equipment, materiel and services to meet SOF requirements. This division negotiates, 
20 Ibid., pp. 19-21. 
21 Ibid., p. 21. 
22 USSOCOM Acquisition Management Training Course, (1996), p. 26. 
16 
awards, administers contracts and serves an advisory role to HQ staff, the SOAE and 
PEOs on procurement issues.23 
b) Procurement Management Division 
This division is responsible for developing and promulgating USSOCOM 
procurement policies and providing support to the Procurement Division by conducting 
compliance reviews, QA reviews and Cost/Price Analysis for procurements. The five 
branches of this division are: Policy, Administration, Procurement Support, Compliance 
and Cost!Price.24 
c) Field Procurement Division 
The Field Procurement Division manages and oversees the activities of 
field offices, including offices within USASOC, NA VSPECW ARCOM and JSOC, 
which are dedicated to support the SOF organizations to which they are attached.25 
3. Program Executive Officers (PEOs) 
The four PEOs (for Maritime and Rotary Programs, Fixed Wing Programs, C41 
Programs and Combat and Special Programs) are assigned by the SOAE as the 
centralized managers responsible for the research, development, acquisition, testing and 
fielding of their assigned programs. PEO responsibilities include but are not limited to: 
• Assigning SAMs for Service-managed programs and recommending PMs 
for appointment by the SOAE for USSOCOM-managed programs. 
• Providing executive guidance to PMs and SAMs assigned SO-peculiar 
program responsibilities. 
• Serving as MDA for designated programs as delegated by the SOAE. 
• Responding to congressional inquiries through the MDAE, to the SOLA 
(Office of Legislative Affairs), as required. 
• Ensuring that PSMOAs (Program Specific Memorandum of Agreement) are 
developed on all Service or agency-managed programs. 
23 USSOCOM SOAC briefmg conducted by the MDAE, (1996), p. 23. 
24 Ibid., p. 24. 
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• Reviewing execution of funds, approving realignment (below threshold 
reprogramming of funds) with other PEOs and preparing supporting fmancial 
documentation. 
• Ensuring accurate cost data (by working with J8) and schedule data are 
included for POM and budget documentation for acquisition programs26• 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter briefly described the ongm of USSOCOM, presented its 
organizational structure, provided a snapshot of its annual budget and described the roles 
and responsibilities of certain organizations within SOAC. Although this was only a 
cursory view of the makeup and mission of USSOCOM, there is sufficient information to 
understand the critical role that USSOCOM plays in our nation's defense. This 
information will contribute to the reader's understanding of USSOCOM's acquisition 
process which will be described in Chapter V. 
25 Ibid., p. 25. 
26 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, pp. 7-9. 
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III. ACQIDSITION REFORM INITIATIVES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The roots of acquisition reform can be traced back to 1808 when Congress created 
a provision entitled "Officials Not to Benefit" in order to prevent congressmen from 
securing contracts for friends and business associates?7 The acquisition process has 
experienced numerous reforms since that time to correct problems ranging from 
inefficiency to overpricing. "The common theme in most acquisition reform proposals is 
that the system must be reorganized to emphasize outcomes rather than procedural 
controls, and efficiency rather than accountability."28 Acquisition reform initiatives 
reviewed in this chapter are the Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management 
(Packard Commission), Defense Management Review (DMR), Defense Acquisition 
Workforce Improvement Act (DA WIA), National Performance Review, Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act (F ASA), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
Acquisition Reform Process Action Team Report, Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
(F ARA), Single Process Initiative (SPI) and "Best Value" contracting. 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze whether USSOCOM is complying with 
these initiatives and to provide recommendations to any procedures that appear to be non-
compliant. Analysis of USSOCOM's acquisition process and its compliance with 
acquisition reform initiatives is presented in Chapter VI. 
B. THE PACKARD COMMISSION 
1. Origin 
On July 15, 1985, President Ronald Reagan established a Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management under Executive Order 12526. The purpose of the 
Commission, referred to as the Packard Commission because of its Chairman David 
27 Beryl A. Hannan, "From the Constitution to F AStA-Origins of Acquisition Reform," Program Manager, 
(September-October 1995), p. 12. 
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Packard, was to identify and develop solutions for structural problems which existed in 
national security planning and budgeting, military organization and command, acquisition 
organization and procedures, and Government-industry accountability.29 Although the 
Packard Commission attracted wide public attention, it failed to prompt the sweeping 
legislative changes that many had thought possible.30 However, each reform initiative 
implemented since that time has its roots in the recommendations of this Commission. 
The Packard Commission analyzed acquisition organization and procedures 
because public confidence in the effectiveness of the acquisition system had been shaken 
by numerous "horror stories" such as overpriced spare parts, test deficiencies and cost 
and schedule overruns. These issues were particularly difficult to cope with because of 
record budget deficits existent at the time. The Commission formed an Acquisition Task 
Force (ATF) directed by William J. Perry to evaluate the defense acquisition system 
(focused on the acquisition of major weapon systems), determine how to improve it and 
to recommend changes that would lead to the acquisition of military equipment with 
equal or greater performance at lower cost and with less delay. Recognizing that defense 
acquisition represents the largest business enterprise in the world, the ATF conducted a 
"search for excellence" by examining Government and commercial organizations that had 
been most successful in acquisition, in order to find a model of excellence for defense 
acquisition. 31 
They found that major institutional changes were required to improve the defense 
acquisition process. Utilizing Deming's Total Quality Management (TQM) principles as 
their guide, the task force determined that a management philosophy which reduces 
oversight and review and encourages organizational participation in the decision making 
28 Kenneth R. Mayer and Anne M. Khademian, "Bringing Politics Back In: Defense Policy and the 
Theoretical Study of Institutions and Processes," Public Administration Review, (March-Aprill996), Vol. 
56, No.2, p. 181. 
29 President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, A Quest for Excellence: Final Report by 
the President's Commission on Defense Management, p. xi, Government Printing Office, Washington 
D.C., 1986. 
30 Linda J. Gregory, "The Role of Configuration Management in the Acquisition Process," National 
Contract Management Journal, (1995), Vol. 26, No. I, p. 33. 
31 President's Blue Ribbon Commission, p. 41. 
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process should be instituted. TQM supporters maintained the belief that their people want 
to do a good job and would work together as a team to achieve common goals. They also 
recognized that implementation of similar management practices within DoD was 
hindered because of an environment of excessive laws, regulations and oversight which 
had developed over several decades. In order to improve, they stressed that DoD should 
model its acquisition process after the successful industrial organizations which they 
researched, by giving acquisition personnel more authority to do their jobs, and by 
minimizing the laws, regulations and oversight which created the problems which were 
so deeply entrenched in the acquisition process. 32 
2. Recommendations 
As previously noted, the ATF focused their research on major system 
acquisitions. Because of deeply entrenched acquisition procedures, the adversarial 
relationship between Government and the defense industry, and the increasing tendency 
of Congress to legislate management solutions, those involved in the acquisition of major 
weapon systems accepted the ten-to-fifteen year acquisition cycle as normal. The ATF 
believed that it was possible to cut the time in half through concerted action of the 
Executive Branch and Congress, and the full support ofindustry.33 
The ATF recommended nine changes in the defense acquisition system that it felt 
could cut the acquisition cycle time in half. It urged the Administration and Congress to 
work together to implement these changes: 
a) Streamline Acquisition Organization and Procedures 
Due to the increasing complexity of acquisition laws, the bureaucracy of 
the acquisition system and the tendency of the Services to exercise policy responsibilities 
without necessary coordination or uniformity, policy responsibility had become 
fragmented. The ATF suggested that in order to streamline the acquisition organization 
and procedures, the establishment of unambiguous authority for overall acquisition 
policy, clear accountability for acquisition execution, and plain lines of command for 
32 Ibid., p. 42. 
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those with program management responsibilities was necessary. The ATF listed five 
related actions they felt were necessary to accomplish the intent of this 
recommendation. 34 
• The establishment by law of the position of an Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition (USD(A)). This individual would be responsible for supervising 
the performance of the entire acquisition system and for setting overall policy 
for research and development (R&D), procurement, logistics, and testing. A 
Level II Presidential appointee, the new Under Secretary would be the 
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) and be responsible to the Secretary of 
Defense. The organization which was in existence at the time allocated 
acquisition responsibilities among eight senior OSD officials, including the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Inspector General.35 
• The establishment of the position of a Service Acquisition Executive (SAE) 
for each Military Department, selected by the Service Secretary in 
consultation with the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). This individual 
would be a top-level civilian Presidential appointee and would be responsible 
for administering Service acquisition programs under policy guidance from 
the DAE.36 
• The appointment of Program Executive Officers (PEO) by each SAE. The 
PEOs would be responsible for a reasonable and defined number of 
acquisition programs. Program Managers (PM) for these programs would 
report directly to their PE0.37 
• A Government-wide recodification of Federal laws into a single, greatly 
simplified statute. The A TF felt that the streamlining of the defense 
33 Ibid., p. 52. 
34 Ibid., pp. 52-53. 
35 Ibid., Appendix G, p. 67. 
36 Ibid., p. 54. 
37 Ibid. 
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acquisition organization had to be matched with streamlined acquisition 
procedures. In order to be accomplished, they urged Congress to work with 
the Administration to recodify Federal laws governing procurement m a 
single, consistent, and greatly simplified procurement statute.38 
• The substantial reduction of acquisition personnel within DoD. With the 
reduction of policy and oversight envisioned by the ATF, they saw an 
opportunity to reduce the total number of personnel in the defense acquisition 
system to levels similar to commercial acquisition counterparts.39 
b) Use Technology to Reduce Cost 
Cost reduction had served as the primary motivation in the introduction of 
new technology to commercial products, and the ATF urged the DoD to adopt the same 
philosophy. By exerting greater discipline in the setting of performance requirements for 
new platforms, and increasing the use of technology to extend the life of existing 
platforms, the ATF saw the potential for substantial reductions in operations and 
maintenance costs, improved performance and service life extensions. 
Because of the high costs and risks associated with state-of-the-art 
technology, the ATF determined that it should only be applied to weapon systems when 
the benefits outweigh the risks. The challenge facing acquisition personnel was the 
difficulty in obtaining reliable information with which to make the trade-off of risks and 
benefits. 
To obtain this information, the ATF recommended building prototypes, 
either at the system or critical subsystem level, for all major weapon systems. They saw 
this as a way to substantially improve military capability, and to provide a basis for 
realistic cost estimates prior to a full-scale development decision. In addition, they 
suggested that streamlined procurement processes be employed in the early phase of 
R&D, and that this phase emphasize informal competition based on ideas and 
technologies, rather than on formal competition of cost. 
38 Ibid., p. 55. 
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In short, the prototype program that they envisioned would show decision 
makers how well the weapon system operates in an operational environment prior to 
committing to full-scale development.40 This concept is referred to today as Advanced 
Concept Technology Design (ACID). 
c) Balance Cost and Performance 
To accomplish this recommendation, the ATF suggested a restructured 
Joint Requirements and Management Board (JRMB), cochaired by the USD(A) and the 
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The board would play an active role in all 
joint programs and in all major Service programs by defining weapon requirements for 
development, and providing an early trade off between cost and performance. 
The primary decisions of the JRMB would be the "affordability" decision 
and the "make-or-buy" decision. These decisions would require the JRMB to determine 
such things as the worth of a new military capability and to justify the need for a unique 
development program if it was possible instead to buy or adapt an existing commercial or 
military system.41 
d) Stabilize Programs 
In order to enhance program stability, the ATF urged DoD to 
institutionalize "baselining" for major weapon systems at the initiation of full-scale 
engineering development and to expand the use of multi-year procurement for high 
priority systems. 
Prepared by the PM, the baseline agreement would describe functional 
specifications, cost, schedule and other factors critical to program success. This baseline 
agreement would be submitted through the responsible PEO and the SAE for approval by 
the DAE. 
As long as the program could be executed within the parameters of the 
baseline, the PM should receive the support of the SAE and DAE. The theory was that 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
41 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
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this arrangement would provide much-needed program stability, which would be 
enhanced significantly if the program received multi-year funding.42 
e) Expand the Use of Commercial Products 
Because DoD is not capable of duplicating the economies of scale possible 
in products serving a mass market, nor the power of the free market to select the most 
innovative and efficient producers, it is unlikely to manufacture products as cheaply as 
the commercial marketplace. 
Based on this opinion, the ATF recommended that the DAE direct 
program managers to get a waiver before using a product made to military specifications, 
if a commercial counterpart existed. They also recommended that the presumption should 
be to buy when a "make-or-buy" decision was being made. In addition, the ATF 
suggested that DoD should reduce its use of military specifications when they are not 
needed, and to take steps to improve the use of military specifications when they are 
needed.43 
.f) Increase the Use of Competition 
The ATF highlighted the need to focus on achieving more effective 
competition, modeled after the competitive procurement techniques used in industry. 
They recommended that Federal law and DoD regulations should allow for substantially 
increased use of commercial-style competition, emphasizing quality and established 
performance as well as price. 
One piece of legislation which created confusion at the time was the 
Competition in Contracting Act's (CICA) requirement of "full and open competition." 
CICA attempted to clarify that competition involved more than just an assessment of 
lower price. However, the intent was obscured by the idea that full and open competition 
precluded the Government from establishing qualification criteria, and forced the award 
of contracts based on price, without regarding technical expertise or life cycle costs. This 
situation reinforced DoD's tendency to write detailed design military specifications rather 
42 Ibid., p. 60. 
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than performance specifications in order to ensure that bidders offered identical items. As 
a result, the intent of CICA was not realized because of a focus on the quantity rather than 
the quality of competition. 
To incorporate truly effective competition, the ATF recommended the 
elimination of regulatory and legal provisions, such as those found in CICA, that were at 
variance with the establishment of commercial competitive practices. By doing so, they 
felt that DoD could greatly increase its use of truly effective competition.44 
g) Clarify the Need for Technical Data Rights 
The ATF recognized that DoD required certain rights to use technical data 
for products developed by its contractors in order to maintain the systems it acquired. 
However, industry was becoming alarmed by DoD's pursuit of unlimited rights in 
technical data to be used in fostering competition. 
The ATF suggested that in order to foster technological innovation and 
private investment, DoD must recognize the balance between the Government's 
requirement for technical data and the benefit to the nation that comes from protecting the 
private sector's proprietary rights. In light of this philosophy, the ATF recommended the 
development of a technical data rights policy with the following principles: 
PRINCIPLE #1 If a product has been developed with private funds, the 
Government should not demand, as a precondition for buying that product, 
unlimited data rights (except as necessary for installation, operation and 
maintenance), even if the Government is the only market. Should the 
Government plan later to seek additional (competitive) sources, the 
required data rights should be obtained through the least obtrusive means 
(e.g., directed licensing) rather than through the pursuit of unlimited 
rights.45 
PRINCIPLE #2 If a product is to be developed with mixed private and 
Government funding, the Government's rights to the data should be 
defined during contract negotiations. Significant private funding should 
43 Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
44 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 
45 Ibid., p. 64. 
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entitle the contractor to retain ownership of the data, subject to a license to 
the Government on a royalty-free or fair royalty basis.46 
PRINCIPLE #3 If a product is developed entirely with Government 
funds, the Government normally acquires all the rights in the resulting 
data. To foster innovation, however, the Government should permit the 
rights to reside in the contractor, subject to a royalty-free license, if the 
data are not needed for dissemination, publication, or competition. 47 
h) Enhance the Quality of Acquisition Personnel 
Having previously recommended the establishment of the position of 
USD(A) and comparable Service positions, the ATF focused on the need to improve the 
defense acquisition workforce. Significant importance was placed on enhancing the 
quality of the workforce by attracting new personnel and improving the training and 
motivation of the existing personnel. 
Although a General Accounting Office (GAO) study of DoD PMs and 
contracting officers confirmed the importance of improving the quality of training of 
these critical acquisition specialties, the need to improve conditions faced by civilian 
acquisition personnel received the ATF' s primary attention. Confronted by such issues as 
confusing regulations, lack of upward mobility, inaccurate evaluation systems, low pay, 
incompetent supervisors and limited resources, the civilian acquisition workforce was 
unable to lure the best college graduates and frequently lost the brightest trainees to 
industry. 




• Establish business-related education and experience criteria for civilian 
contracting personnel. 
• Establish an alternative personnel management system permitting greater 
flexibility with respect to the status, pay and qualifications of civilian 
employees. 
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• Expand opportunities for the education and training of all civilian acquisition 
personnel. Such training should be centrally managed and funded. 
• DoD should enhance the professional status of contract specialists (GS 1102s) 
by increasing the number of outside hires, conducting on-campus recruitment, 
mandating the use of written tests for in-service placement and promotion and 
establishing upward mobility programs for purchasing agents (GS 1105) and 
procurement clerks (GS 11 06).48 
i) Improve the Capability for Industrial Mobilization 
Faced with aging industrial facilities and an increasing dependence on 
foreign sources for strategic raw materials, subassemblies and manufactured components, 
American industry essentially did no industrial planning. Contributing factors cited by the 
ATF included the lack of firm requirements upon which contractors could base their 
planning, the lack of DoD funding and DoD procurement practices which disincentivised 
U.S. manufacturers from modernizing their production processes. 
The ATF recommended that the President establish a comprehensive 
national industrial responsiveness policy and that the Secretary of Defense develop surge 
mobilization requirements for basic wartime defense industries. DoD and SAEs would 
then consider this guidance in formulating their acquisition policies, and PMs would 
incorporate industrial surge and mobilization considerations in program execution.49 
C. THE DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REVIEW (DMR) 
1. Origin 
As the sixth major study of defense acquisition over four decades, the Packard 
Commission was viewed by some in Congress as the latest effort to address the problems 
in defense procurement. As former House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les 
Aspin stated, "Perhaps the next executive commission on acquisition should be created, 
not to propose reforms, but to implement them." In June 1989, Secretary of Defense Dick 
48 Ibid., pp. 66-68. 
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Cheney followed through on that recommendation in his Defense Management Review 
(DMR). The purpose of the DMR was to implement the recommendations of the Packard 
Commission and to provide a framework for continued improvements in DoD acquisition 
practices. Key words which expressed the specific objectives of the review were: defense 
strength and readiness, new weapon systems at less cost and time, assured achievement of 
planned performance and greater public confidence in stewardship by DoD.50 This 
executive-legislative branch partnership was implicitly recognized by the Senate in 
approving the legislation that authorized the formation of the "Advisory Panel on 
Streamlining and Codification of the Acquisition Laws," referred to as the Section 800 
Panel. 51 The Panel was created to comply with section 800 of Public law (P. L.) 101-510, 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991.52 
2. Recommendations 
The Section 800 Panel reviewed more than 600 of the 889 statutes that constituted 
acquisition law. The laws were categorized as to whether they should be repealed, 
retained, amended, sustained or deleted. In January 1993, the panel transmitted a ten-
volume report to Congress calling for radical changes in DoD procurement.53 Different 
sections of the report include the management framework section, the defense acquisition 
section and the Government-Industry Relationship section. 
The management framework section delineates roles for the top ten DoD 
executives and groups. It highlighted the need for these individuals to integrate their 
efforts so that a sound, affordable defense could be achieved. 54 
In the section on defense acquisition, the DMR report expresses the need for 
defense acquisition to imitate the most successful commercial and Governmental 
acquisition practices. Recommendations included establishing clearer command channels, 
49 Ibid., pp. 70-71. 
50 Stanley N. Shennan, Government Procurement Management (Germantown, Maryland, 1991), p. 166. 
51 Gregory, p. 34. 
52 Joseph A. Pegnato, "Procureosclerosis," National Contract Management Journal, (1995), Vol. 26, No.2, 
p. 66. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Shennan, p. 166. 
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stabilizing programs, limiting reporting requirements and establishing small, high-quality 
staffs. 55 
The Government-Industry Relationship section focused on ethical behavior within 
the Government, and increased ethical accountability within industry. 56 
Some of the specific legislative proposals in the report included: 
• Removing the ten percent minimum savings requirement for the department to 
use multi-year procurement. 
• Establishing an alternative personnel program for civilian acquisition 
employees. 
• Authorizing use of "best-buy" decision authority for selection of sources 
under competition, when no discussions were held. 
• Exempting commercial product acquisitions from the unique requirements of 
the Government procurement system. 
• Establishing an alternative personnel program for civilian acquisition 
programs. 57 
Additional recommendations of the DMR Report included: 
• Stipulating that commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) goods be purchased 
whenever possible. 
• Increasing the small purchase threshold from $25,000 to $100,000.58 
• Reducing the number of protest forums. 
• Disclosing more information to unsuccessful bidders in debriefmgs. 
• Exempting contracts below the small purchase threshold ($1 00,000) from 
most socioeconomic requirements. 59 
• Deleting warranty provisions for major weapon system guarantees. 
55 Ibid., pp. 166-168. 
56 Ibid., p. 170. 
57 Ibid., p. 171. 
58 
"U.S. Acquisition Review," International Defense Review, (August 1, 1994), Vol. 27, No.8, p. 6. 
59 Pegnato, p. 66. 
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• Implementing a major overhaul of laws pertaining to small business and small 
disadvantaged business. 
• Repealing the Byrd Amendment (regarding lobbying disclosure). 
• Outlining a new alternative approach for dealing with technical data which 
focused on the Government's need to ensure reasonable life cycle costs for 
spare parts and other follow-on purchases. 60 
Numerous reform initiatives were based on the DMR Report, including Defense 
Secretary William Perry's directive to use commercial and performance based standards 
instead of military specification (MILSPECs) in acquisition programs. The directive 
requires the use of commercial specifications whenever possible and requires special 
waivers for those situations when MIL SPECs are needed. 
As stated in the DMR Report summary, the report provided a catalog of proposed 
changes, however, it did not guarantee that the recommendations would be accomplished. 
It also stated that the recommendations presented, particularly the thrusts toward 
streamlining management by reducing layers of review authority and adopting 
commercial practices, would likely bring about improvements in Government 
procurement if they were carried out. 61 
D. THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENT ACT 
(DAWIA) 
1. Origin 
On November 5, 1990, Congress passed Public Law 101-510, known as the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DA WIA). The Packard Commission 
Report, which expressed concern over the loss of qualified acquisition personnel and the 
inexperience of DoD personnel at the negotiating table, was cited as a factor in the 
adoption of DA WIA. The act was signed into law in November 1991, and addressed 
numerous long-standing management weaknesses affecting acquisition programs. The 
intended policy outcome of DA WIA was to " ... create a body of well-educated, trained, 
60 Gregory, p. 35. 
31 
and dedicated acquisition professionals. . . . The effect of this legislation will be to 
develop an expert acquisition workforce with distinctive career paths from entry to the 
most senior levels."62 
2. Recommendations 
To correct the weaknesses and deficiencies m the management of DoD's 
acquisition workforce, 19 policies were enacted in DA WIA for implementation by the 
Secretary of Defense. The following is a partial listing of those policies: 
• Required SECDEF to designate in regulations the positions in the DoD that 
are acquisition positions. 
• Required USD(A) to manage the acquisition workforce. 
• Established the position of Director of Acquisition, Education, Training and 
Career Development within OSD. 
• Established an Acquisition Career Program Board in each military department 
andinOSD. 
• Required SECDEF to ensure that an Acquisition Corps was established in 
each military department and in OSD. 
• Designated specific acquisition positions as critical acquisition positions and 
specified that only members of the Acquisition Corps would be appointed to 
the critical positions. 
• Specified a minimum three-year tour requirement for appointment to all 
critical acquisition positions. 
• Required SECDEF to establish a defense acquisition university structure. 
The first year that all of the DA WIA provisions were in effect was Fiscal Year 
(FY) 1994. This provided DoD three years to accomplish the specific requirements for 
education, training and experience delineated in the Act. The Act also permitted DoD 
officials to waive specific qualification requirements if: "(1) unusual circumstances 
61 Shennan., p. 171. 
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justified a waiver or (2) an individuals qualifications eliminated the need for meeting the 
requirement. "63 
To ensure that DoD remains in compliance with DA WIA, the Act requires the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) to report annually, through 1998, on DoD's 
compliance with the waiver provisions. It also required GAO to report on DoD's overall 
implementation of the Act. 64 
E. THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
1. Origin 
The National Performance Review (NPR) began in March 1993 when President 
Clinton directed Vice President AI Gore to review the Federal Government to move from 
" ... red tape to results to create a government that works better and costs less."65 The NPR 
examined budgeting, procurement and personnel systems, however procurement reform 
was the key element of the review. 
2. Recommendations 
The report accompanying the NPR, Reinventing Federal Procurement, looked at 
all levels of Government to determine where the acquisition process could be improved. 
The report detailed 20 initiatives, including 63 actions, intended to reform Federal 
procurement. Fifteen of the actions required action by the President or Office of 
Management and Budget to be implemented. Twenty six actions required legislative 
action by Congress and 22 could be implemented at the Agency level. 66 The following is 
a partial listing of the 20 initiatives and a sampling of their associated actions: 
62 Roy R. Schleiden, The Impact of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act on the 
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63 David E. Cooper, "Acquisition Management-Fiscal Year 1995 Waivers of Acquisition Workforce 
Requirements," (April IS, 1996), Rpt.-Number: GAO/NSIADD-96-102. 
64 1bid. 
65 Teri S. Snyder, Applying the National Performance Review Procurement Reform Initiatives at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1994, p. 6. 
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• Reframe Acquisition Policy by converting 1,600 pages of the FAR from rigid 
rules to guiding principles. 
• Encourage more procurement innovation by providing new legislative 
authority to test innovative procurement methods. 
• Expand electronic commerce for Federal acquisition by establishing a 
Government-wide program to use electronic commerce for Federal 
procurement. 
• Amend protest rules by establishing a single forum within the judicial branch 
to consider protests and allowing penalties for frivolous protests. 
• Enhance programs for small business and small disadvantaged business 
concerns by authorizing civilian agencies to conduct small disadvantaged 
business set-asides. 
• Foster reliance on the commercial marketplace by changing laws to facilitate 
buying commercially available items. 
• Lower costs and reduce bureaucracy in small purchase through the use of 
purchase cards. 
• Authorize a two-phase competitive source selection process and multiyear 
contracts. 
• Encourage "best value" procurement. 
• Reform information technology procurement by increasing delegation of 
authority to individual agencies. 67 
The initiatives, which had similarities to the Section 800 Panel recommendations, 
were expected to create a more responsive, efficient and innovative procurement system. 
If all initiatives were enacted, the report estimated five year savings in excess of $22 
billion, with first-year savings expected to reach $5 billion. The following sections 
demonstrate that many of the recommendations of the NPR and Section 800 Panel were 
codified into law. 
67 Ibid., pp. 26-33. 
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F. THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION STREAMLINING ACT (FASA) 
1. Origin 
On October 13, 1994, FASA was signed into law by President Clinton. The 
legislation streamlined the Federal Government's $200-billion-a-year acquisition system 
and changed the way the Government performs contracting actions. 
2. Recommendations 
The centerpiece of this legislation was Title VIII, which contains provisions that 
significantly change the way the Federal Government purchases commercial items in 
order to increase the Government's reliance on those items. Related provisions also 
changed the way price negotiations were to be conducted in commercial item 
acquisitions. The new provisions reduced the burden on companies selling commercial 
items to the Government and simplified the requirements of Government officials 
purchasing those items. 68 F ASA also sought to: (1) streamline the procurement process 
for high-volume, low value acquisitions; (2) improve access by small business to 
Government contracting opportunities; (3) improve the bid protest procedures; and (4) 
extend Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) requirements to civilian agencies and raise to 
$500,000 the threshold for submitting certified cost or pricing data under that act.69 
A further description of these provisions is as follows: 
a) Acquiring Commercial Items 
F ASA strongly stated the Government's preference for buying COTS 
items. To encourage the private sector to sell to the Government, the statute provided a 
broader definition of commercial items and eliminated numerous statutory requirements 
for purchasing those items. The goal of the changes was to simplify the procurement 
process for companies who do not ordinarily sell to the Government. 70 
68 Ron R. Hutchinson, "A Practical Guide to the New Commercial Item Provisions Contained inS 1587, 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994," Federal Contracts Report, (October 10, 1994), 62 FCR 
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b) Simplified Acquisition Threshold 
F ASA also raised the simplified acquisition threshold from $25,000 to 
$100,000. This change was significant because over 90 percent of annual Federal 
procurement transactions are below $100,000. This issue was strongly contested by the 
small business community because they anticipated fewer opportunities to compete on 
Government acquisitions. In consideration of small business, the Act reserves all 
acquisitions between $2,500 and $100,000 exclusively to small business. One of the 
stipulations of this provision was that the threshold could not exceed $50,000 until the 
agency became FACNET (Federal Acquisition Computer Network) certified.71 The 
statute also encouraged the use of credit cards for purchases below $2,500. 
c) Protests and Claims 
F ASA required that prospective contractors who are not selected for award 
be debriefed within five days and told why their offer was not accepted. The statute also 
reduces the time period for bringing suit in the United States Federal Claims Court from 
12 months to 90 days after receiving a contracting officer's fmal decision on a contract 
claim.72 
d) Small Business Procedures 
The statute required that civilian agencies, as well as DoD, set-aside 
certain contracts to ensure that five percent of Federal contracts are awarded to small 
disadvantaged businesses. F ASA also created a five-percent women-owned business 
contracting goal. 73 
e) Truth in Negotiations (TINA) 
F ASA raised the TINA threshold for submitting cost or pricing data from 





DoD. The purpose of raising the threshold was to reduce the risk of inaccurate cost or 
pricing data submissions and to lessen the contractor's burden of compiling such data. 74 
Although F ASA addressed some of the fundamental issues affecting the 
procurement process, it did not completely streamline it. The Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition Reform created several process action teams (PATs) to consider 
additional aspects of acquisition reform, and additional legislation was forwarded to 
Congress soon after FASA's passage. 
G. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (OSD) ACQUISITION 
PROCESS ACTION TEAM REPORT 
1. Origin 
In February 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry issued a memorandum 
entitled Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change. In it he concluded that "DoD must 
reduce the cost of the acquisition process by the elimination of activities that, although 
being performed by many dedicated and hard working personnel, are not necessary or 
cost effective in today's environment." He stressed the need to institute a process where 
decision making is made across organizational structures by Integrated Product Teams 
(IPTs) and a " ... shift from an environment of regulation and enforcement to one of 
incentivized performance. "75 
In order to accomplish this goal, Secretary Perry chartered a Process Action Team 
(PAT) to " ... develop ... a comprehensive plan to reengineer the oversight and review 
process for systems acquisition, ... to make it more efficient and effective, while 
maintaining an appropriate level of oversight."76 The final report of the PAT, entitled 
"Reengineering the Acquisition Oversight and Review Process," provided a roadmap 
that would bring about the needed changes. The report included the team's vision, 
objectives, methods for measuring success, 33 recommendations and an overview of 
741bid. 
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their results. Because several secondary thesis questions pertain to this report, it will be 
presented more thoroughly than the previous reform initiatives discussed in this chapter. 
2. Vision 
Developed collaboratively by the OSD PAT members, their vision statement was 
geared toward ensuring that every element of the reengineering they were tasked to 
develop moved them where they wanted to go. Their vision reads as follows: 
"To have a modernized oversight and review process, hard-linked to the national military 
strategy, responsive to the priorities of the warfighting Commanders-in-Chief, sensitive 
to costs and characterized by mutual trust, flexibility, teamwork and common sense.'m 
For the purpose of the PAT report, the PAT adopted the following definitions for 
"oversight" and "review": 
• Oversight: The continuous process of evaluating program execution between 
decision points. Examples include program status reporting, compliance 
auditing and inspecting. At any point in the oversight process, the decision 
maker (from PMs through the DAE) may decide to do nothing, to intervene 
or to directly [sic] ask for additional information. 
• Review: The discrete process of gathering and evaluating information. 
Examples include milestone reviews and other program decision reviews. 
3. Objectives 
In order to attain the SECDEF's goal of a reengineered acquisition process, the 
OSD PAT developed nine objectives that they wanted the reengineered acquisition 
process to accomplish. The objectives, all of which pertain to the oversight and review 
process, are as follows: 
a) Help field what the warjighter needs when he needs it. 
The basic premise is that the reengineered process should facilitate getting 
quality products faster, better and cheaper.78 
77 Ibid., p. vi. 
78 Ibid., p. 2. 
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b) Demand accountability by matching managerial authority with 
responsibility. 
The PAT felt that the reengineered process should allow the lowest level 
possible in the executing chain to make decisions and that those individuals be held 
accountable for their decisions. Additionally, they stated that individuals outside the 
executing chain should not be authorized to either make or delay decisions. 79 
c) Promote flexibility and encourage innovation based on mutual 
trust, risk management and program performance. 
The basic premise in this objective is that those closest to the information 
are competent and trustworthy enough to make reasonable decisions, therefore the 
processes should be readily tailorable based on such factors as program risk and total 
dollar value. 80 
d) Foster constant teamwork among everyone who is a stakeholder. 
Teamwork is developed by sharing a common goal of optimizing the 
product to be delivered to the warfighter. This objective was developed to ensure that the 
reengineered processes foster teamwork. 81 
e) Actively promote program stability. 
This objective recognizes the disruptive nature of delayed decisions and 
decision revisits on acquisition programs. It states that oversight and review processes 
should only delay or undo decisions in those circumstances where a delayed decision is 
prudent or where previous decisions were fatally flawed. 82 
f) Balance the value of oversight and review with its costs. 
This objective is geared towards ensuring that the time, dollar, manpower 
and opportunity costs of the oversight and review processes are clearly outweighed by 







g) Emulate the best practices of successful commercial companies 
and successful Government ventures. 
Reflecting the recommendation of the Packard Commission Report, the 
purpose of this objective was to ensure that the reengineered oversight and review 
processes used those successful practices as their benchmark. 84 
h) Preserve the public trust. 
This objective calls for developing reengineered oversight and review 
processes that generate public confidence in the management of public funds. 85 
4. Measuring Success 
The PAT felt that an essential element of the reengineering process was to 
develop some ambitious, quantifiable goals which they described as "stretch" goals. 
These goals, which serve the purpose of translating Secretary Perry's mandate into 
something measurable, were also developed to focus managerial attention on the 
important issues and form the basis for the reengineering process. The PAT believed that 
implementation of their 33 recommendations would contribute to aggregate progress of 
each of the goals. They found no metrics at either the macro or individual program level, 
to periodically measure the cost or value of oversight and review. They felt that a small 
set of key metrics at the macro level was critical toward measuring progress toward the 
reengineered system mandated by Secretary Perry. The "stretch" goals described below 
serve as the basis of the metrics. Although the PAT believed the goals represented a 
significant challenge, they felt they were realistic in that they were achievable within five 
years or less. 86 
a) Reduce the percentage of programs with Acquisition Program 
Baseline Breaches to no more than five percent. 
The PAT's position was that if the oversight and review processes were in 
control, a breach should be a rarity.87 
84 Ibid., p. 3. 
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b) Reduce cycle time by 50 percent. 
This goal is directly related to getting material to the warfighter faster. 
Progress toward this goal reflects a more effective method of balancing requirements and 
the time it takes to achieve them, improved risk management and more stabilizing of 
program budgets. 88 
c) Reduce the number of people in the acquisition oversight and 
review process by 50 percent. 
Achieving this goal requires organizations to focus on the added value of 
activities within their organizations. Those activities that add the least value must be 
eliminated as part of the reengineering process. Moving toward this goal directly 
increases efficiency and reduces direct and opportunity costs. 89 
d) Reduce the average cost of a milestone review by 50 percent. 
The most substantial costs associated with milestone reviews are indirect 
costs--particularly opportunity costs. Because program offices do not hire people 
temporarily to prepare milestone documentation, the program offices compensate by 
maintaining an overstaffed workforce or diluting the work on concurrent activities. A 
substantial decrease in aggregate milestone costs will indicate a big step toward increased 
efficiency and effective use of the work force.90 
5. Recommendations 
The PAT developed 33 recommendations to achieve a reengineered oversight and 
review process. Of those, seven were related to the oversight process and eight to the 
review process. The remaining eighteen recommendations did not fit neatly into the 
oversight or review categories but are key features of the reengineered process. 
To keep the PAT report modular and to help follow-on implementation teams 
move out on the Secretary's adopted recommendations, a second volume containing 
separate implementation plans for each recommendation was developed. Although each 




of the 33 recommendations has some influence on USSOCOM's acquisition process, the 
eight that are described below are most relevant to their organization. 
a) Oversight process recommendations 
• The PAT recommends that the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) 
and Component Acquisition Executive's (CAE) institutionalize the 
use of Integrated Product Teams (IPT) lead by PEO-qualified leaders 
to provide advice to them and to help the PM.91 
The use of multidisciplinary, integrated staffs would help establish a 
product oriented focus, rather than a functional issues focus. Although many contractors 
and Government program offices had made significant progress shifting toward IPTs, 
Component's headquarters and OSD remained functionally oriented. The PAT felt that a 
shift to IPTs would give individuals that had been vested with some integration 
responsibility the stature and accountability they needed to resolve issues and make 
decisions.92 
• The PAT recommends that the DAE adopt a new, more continuous 
oversight process on an electronic information net, face-to-face 
communication with the PM and the decision makers ... For programs 
requiring more information, the decision makers may tailor in 
additional requirements, as appropriate.93 
The availability of electronic information technology facilitates the 
reporting of routine oversight information on a near real time basis. The PAT viewed the 
use of existing electronic tools as a way to accelerate the oversight reporting process, 
with less labor and lower costs.94 
b) Review process recommendations 
• The PAT recommends an immediate transition to the three milestone 
process for all ACAT I programs with an evolutionary transition over 
the next year to the less than ACAT I programs.95 
91 Reengineering the Acquisition Oversight and Review Process, Volume II, Office of the Secretary of 
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The three milestone process recommended by the PAT would align the 
MDA with the importance of the decision being made and provide for delegation of other 
in-phase decisions to lower levels. 
The PAT expected resistance within the acquisition and budgeting 
community and anticipated that the Component user communities would resist the CJCS 
role in assigning priorities that would impact resource allocation. Despite these barriers, 
the PAT's opinion was that placing the Need Validation and follow-on Concept 
Exploration responsibilities with the user would more properly align the requirements 
decision with the users. In addition, the PAT felt that the three milestone process would 
reduce the number of program reviews and reduce the decision making timeline for in-
phase decisions.96 
• The PAT recommends that there be only one formal review before a 
milestone decision meeting. The CAE will chair that review. An IPT 
comprised of users, OSD and Component staffs, as well as program 
office staff will prepare for the meeting. The product team leader 
should be the product-focused OSD Oversight IPT leader. The leader's 
responsibilities are to accomplish all prerequisite activities and to 
resolve issues within the IPT.97 
The milestone review process was sequential and prone to delays. This 
recommendation utilizes the recommendation to adopt IPTs at headquarters staffs to 
replace the sequential decision-making process with a single meeting. Recognizing that 
preparation for a milestone meeting remained a complex undertaking, the PAT felt that 
functional staffs should have the flexibility to use whatever processes were appropriate to 
prepare for the decision meeting. Implementing this recommendation would reduce hand-
offs, steps and opportunities for delay, identify a process owner (IPT leader) and mitigate 
the "us versus them" mentality inherent in Component reviews. 98 
• The PAT recommends that CABs review the unique documentation 
imposed on Defense acquisition programs by their Component or sub-
961bid. 
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Components. These executives should eliminate all Component 
documents that satisfy a unique requirement.99 
Implementing this recommendation would require CAEs to scrub their 
internal documentation and streamline, revise or delete unnecessary requirements. 
Because of the well established constituencies within Component HQ staffs, the PAT 
anticipated that supporters ofthese documents would be reluctant to make any changes.100 
c) Other recommendations 
• The PAT recommends that the Defense Resources Board adopt, for 
ACAT I programs, the affordability process that the report describes. 
This process would apply at program milestones as well as during 
budget and bill paying phases.101 
This recommendation depends on the Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council (JROC), acting as a representative of the CJCS, to resolve interservice disputes 
and make timely, unambiguous decisions on program priorities. The PAT also stated that 
the Comptroller would have to accept a role as executor of budget decisions rather than 
initiator of them. Although implementing this recommendation would require certain 
individuals in power positions to cede power, the PAT predicted a more timely and robust 
decision process which enabled the joint warfighting community to establish priorities.102 
• The PAT recommends that the DAE direct that contractor past 
performance be elevated to a dominant factor in all source selections 
not later than July 1, 1995. In rare instances where this may be 
inappropriate, the CAE may approve a waiver. 103 
Shifting business to contractors that demonstrate superior performance 
represented a potential for significant resource savings to the PAT, specifically through a 
reduction in Government oversight. They also anticipated that implementing this 
recommendation lead would to a long-term increase in the competitiveness of US 
99 Ibid., p. 62. 
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industry, enhance teamwork between Government and industry and result in higher 
quality products a cheaper price. 104 
• The PAT recommends that all acquisition programs, regardless of 
ACAT classification, be aligned in the PM-PEO-CAE chain, wherein 
the PEO is a full time acquisition manager and reports directly to and 
receives guidance from the CAE. 105 
Realigning all acquisition programs under PEOs would provide a clear, 
simplified chain of command for all acquisition managers and allow lower ACAT 
programs to be aligned organizationally more directly with higher ACAT programs they 
support. Despite these advantages, the PAT anticipated that material commands would be 
reluctant to surrender management control of their acquisition programs and would resist 
the loss of acquisition funds under their control. 106 
6. Overview of Results 
The key features of the PAT's reengineered process model were consistent with 
the Packard Commission Report and addressed virtually every important aspect of the 
acquisition oversight and review process. According to the PAT, those key features 
would ensure that the reengineered model would: 
1041bid. 
• Forge a three milestone process. 
• Trim milestone decision documents and activities. 
• Collapse the number of formal pre-milestone meetings to one. 
• Institutionalize IPTs to do oversight and review. 
• Align program accountability and reporting. 
• Centralize the affordability decision by placing it into the warfighters hands. 
• Consolidate the oversight and review process for joint programs and those 
programs requiring substantial inter-service harmonizing. 
• Revitalize the acquisition program baseline (APB). 
105 Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
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• Strengthen PM experience, tenure and selection requirements. 107 
The value of this report can be measured by the changes that have taken place 
since it was published in December 1994. The most significant of those changes are 
reflected in the update of the DoD 5000 series of documents, which separate mandatory 
acquisition policies and procedures from discretionary practices. These updates establish 
the guiding principles for all defense acquisition and help create an acquisition system 
that capitalizes on the strengths of all participants in the acquisition process. 
H. THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REFORM ACT (FARA) 
1. Origin 
Signed into law by President Clinton on February 10, 1996, FARA was originally 
enacted as part of the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Act. It is applicable to civilian 
agencies as well as DoD. According to Colleen A. Preston, the Deputy Under Secretary 
of Defense for Acquisition, "the total impact of the measures in this year's Defense 
Authorization Act is as large as that of the F ASA. This is a very important step in 
acquisition reform."108 Previously, Secretary of Defense William Perry stated that the 
legislation "moved us much further along to the reengineered acquisition system that we 
must have to meet our 2J51 Century needs."109 A few ofthe provisions in FARA are listed 
in the section below. 
2. Provisions 
a) Brooks Act Repealed 
The 1965 Brooks Act gave all Federal information technology (IT) 
acquisition and management authority to the General Services Administration (GSA). 
This law led to inefficiencies in the purchase of IT and meant that many DoD computers 
were obsolete by the time they were delivered. Repeal of the Brooks Act avoided the 
obsolescence problem and eliminated the exclusive authority of the General Services 
107 Reengineering, Volume I, pp. 4-6. 
108 
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Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) to handle IT bid protests. All protests are now 
being handled by the GA0.110 
b) Efficient Competition 
The Act permitted contracting officers to limit the number of bidders in 
the competitive range in order to promote efficiency. This authority enables agencies to 
expedite the procurement process, and allowed bidders, which had no chance of receiving 
the award, to save time and money by being removed sooner in the process.111 
c) Post-Employment 
F ARA amended the procurement integrity law to focus on the improper 
disclosure of contract award information. Post employment restrictions were made 
simpler and clearer, applying across the Government to officials in procurements above 
$1 0 million. The hiw enhances the attractiveness of Federal service because individuals 
could be more certain of their legal and ethical obligations should they decide to work in 
the private sector.112 
d) Simplified Procedures for Certain Commercial Purchases 
For a three-year period, commercial items up to $5 million in contract 
value can be purchased under simplified procedures. This includes an exemption from 
publishing the opportunity in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD) and elimination of 
the requirement to hold the solicitation open for at least 30 days.113 
e) Broader Definition of Commercial Services 
The definition of the term "commercial services" is expanded to include 
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.f) Efficient Competitive Range Determinations 
This enables contracting officers to limit the number of proposals in the 
competitive range if they determine that the number of proposals that would otherwise be 
included in the competitive range exceeds the number at which an efficient competition 
can be conducted.115 
Although some of the significant legal difficulties associated with 
Government contracting were reduced by this act, "the changes brought about will be 
more evolutionary than revolutionary. The certification reductions accomplished under 
F ARA are best viewed as part of an ongoing trend to reduce or eliminate unnecessary 
Government contract certifications."116 
I. OTHER INITIATIVES 
1. Best Value Contracting 
Best value is a process used in competitive, negotiated contracting to select the 
most advantageous offer by evaluating and comparing factors in addition to cost or price. 
The intent is to award to the contractor that will give the Government the greatest or best 
value for its money. It is the preferred source selection methodology, following the 
issuance of Executive Order 12931 on December 13, 1994, which directed executive 
agencies to "place more emphasis on past performance and promote best value rather than 
simply low cost in selecting sources for supplies and services."117 
Best value assesses many factors including past performance, ability to meet 
contract schedule, life cycle costs, maintainability and product improvement, just to name 
a few. Determining which best value criteria to apply for a particular procurement rests 
with the acquisition agent/buyer in conjunction with the user. 118 From an acquisition 
115 Ibid., p. 1. 
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reform perspective, the changes PMs are expected to integrate into their existing process 
are matters of degree which: 
• Allows greater offeror proposal flexibility. 
• Assumes greater risk in tech/cost tradeoffs. 
• Expands the use of best value into areas other than cost reimbursable R&D 
and systems acquisitions. 
• Encourages greater tailoring of source selection factors/subfactors. 119 
2. Single Process Initiative (SPI) 
In December 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry promulgated his policy 
on Single Process Initiative (SPI). The intent of the initiative is to eliminate the use of 
different processes or specifications for similar operations within a contractor's facility 
which exist as a result of differing requirements in various contracts. SPI applies to all 
contracts and is implemented using a "block change" modification approach. This 
involves the consolidation or elimination of multiple processes, specifications and 
standards in all contracts on a facility-wide basis, rather than on a contract-by-contract 
basis. Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs) are responsible for managing the SPI 
effort in the facilities to which they are assigned.120 
Perhaps the most unique feature of SPI is the urgency that SECDEF and the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)) placed on 
getting it implemented as quickly as possible. The underlying purpose for the urgency is 
that the savings related to SPI can not be achieved until contracts are changed. Once this 
is accomplished, the result will be more efficient, consistent and stable processes, 
simplified contract administration for the contractor and the Government and significant 
savings for the taxpayer. 121 
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3. Update of DoD 5000 Documents 
Reference was made in the section on the OSD Acquisition Process Action Team 
Final Report/Implementation Plan about the influence the OSD A-PAT had on changing 
the DoD 5000 documents. That influence is apparent in the executive summary from 
OSD discussing the DoD 5000 updates which states "the intent of the DoD 5000 revision 
is to define an acquisition environment that makes DoD the smartest, most responsive 
buyer of the best goods and services, that meet our warfighters' needs, at the best dollar 
value over the life of the product." 122 
The update accomplishes the following objectives: 
• Incorporates FASA and the institutionalization of Integrated Product Teams. 
• Separates mandatory policies and procedures from discretionary practices. 
• Responds to the perception that the acquisition policy documents have 
become too complex by significantly reducing the length and complexity of 
the 5000 documents and by making them available on-line for the first time. 
• Integrates for the first time acquisition policies and procedures for both 
weapon systems and automated information systems. 123 
The major themes of the update seem to be a direct reflection of the acquisition 
environment that the Packard Commission envisioned ten years earlier. The first theme, 
teamwork, stresses the importance and advantages of using all interested parties in the 
acquisition process. This is accomplished through the use of Integrated Product Teams 
(IPTs) which are designed to maximize overall performance, not just the performance of 
individual functional areas. The second theme, tailoring, is intended to give the 
Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) the ability to apply common sense and sound 
business management practices to the acquisition process. This theme urges MDAs to 
promote flexible, tailored approaches to oversight and review based on mutual trust and 
the program's size, risk and complexity. The primary intent of the third theme, 
122 Paul Kaminski, Philip Coyle and Emmett Paige, Jr., "Memorandum for the Defense Acquisition 
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empowerment, is to balance responsibility with authority, not to reduce responsibility. 
This is accomplished by reducing mandatory procedures and encouraging prudent risk 
management. The fourth theme, Cost as an Independent Variable (CAIV), is difficult 
for many organizations to defme and apply. The intent of the theme is to urge decision 
makers to consider the cost and performance trade-offs they are willing to accept when 
developing a system. Increasing the use of commercial products in DoD acquisition is 
the fifth theme of the DoD 5000 series update. This practice not only reduces DoD's 
reliance on MILSPECs but also provide the means to take advantage of the technological 
advances occurring in the comrilercial sector today. The final theme, best practices, 
implies taking the best practices of commercial and Government activities when 
developing acquisition strategies. DoD 5000.2-R contains a simplified and flexible 
management process based on these practices to serve as a guideline. 124 
J. SUMMARY 
As previously stated, the purpose of this thesis is to review acquisition reform 
initiatives from the Packard Commission until the present, and to analyze whether the 
acquisition process at USSOCOM complies with those initiatives. This chapter presented 
those initiatives, however, the Packard Commission and OSD Acquisition Reform 
Process Action Team Report were described in greater detail than the others. 
The reason for this approach was to document fully the vision that the members 
of the Packard Commission, specifically the Acquisition Task Force (ATF), had for 
improving the acquisition process. When reading the summaries of the subsequent 
reform initiatives, the reader should agree that the Packard Commission's Report served 
as the genesis for all acquisition reform that has occurred in the past decade, and that each 
of the nine changes to the defense acquisition system (i.e. (1) streamline acquisition 
organization and procedures; (2) use technology to reduce cost; . . . (9) improve the 
capability for industrial mobilization) recommended by the ATF were addressed in 
subsequent reform initiatives. 
124 Kaminski, Coyle and Paige, pp. 2-3. 
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An interesting discovery made while researching this chapter was that the 
Chairman of the Packard Commission's ATF was William Perry, the current Secretary of 
Defense. It makes sense that he has been so proactive in the acquisition reform arena the 
past four years. The ideas and directives that he issued in: (1) Acquisition Reform: A 
Mandate for Change; (2) Acquisition Reform; and (3) Specifications and Standards-A 
New Way of Doing Business, mirror many of the recommendations of the ATF that he 
chaired a decade ago. 
The OSD Acquisition Reform Process Action Team Report was also thoroughly 
discussed because of the direct influence that it had on the March 1996 DoD 5000 
updates. In addition, the OSD report is the only reform initiative, other than the Packard 
Commission, that reviewed the entire acquisition process within DoD. The information 
found in the OSD report will be useful when USSOCOM's acquisition process is 
discussed in Chapter V and analyzed in Chapter VI. 
Most of the reform initiatives discussed in this chapter have been incorporated 
into today's acquisition culture. The Ten Guiding Principles of Acquisition Reform, 
developed by Ms. Colleen Preston, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition 
Reform, reflects that cultural change and effectively summarizes the contents of this 
chapter. Those principles are: 
1. Empower people to manage--not avoid risk 
• Delegate authority and reward results. 
• Encourage innovation by issuing guidance not rules. 
2. Operate in Integrated Product Teams 
• Replace functional stove pipes with integrated program teams. 
• Manage with early insight on program issues, rather than after-the-
fact oversight. 
• Resolve issues at the lowest possible level. 
• Partner and team with industry. 
3. Reduce cycle time by 50% 
• Tailor the process to the specific acquisition. 
• Structure so that fewer people are involved and the need for 
coordination is reduced. 
4. Reduce cost of ownership 
• Manage overall life cycle cost not just initial acquisition cost. 
• Treat cost as an independent variable 
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• Make cost performance trade-offs early in the acquisition process. 
5. Expand the use of commercial products and processes 
• Begin dialogue with industry early in requirements development 
process. 
• Give priority to customary commercial practices. 
6. Use Performance SPECs and non-Government Standards 
• Use performance SPECs as the preferred choice for all programs. 
• Use non-Government standards when performance SPECs are not 
practical. 
• Use MILSPECs/STDs only as a last resort with an appropriate 
wruver. 
7. Issue solicitations that reflect the quality of a world class buyer 
• Write cohesive statements of work that specify "what" not "how." 
• Maximum use ofFACNET and simplified acquisition procedures. 
• Coordinate in advance to gain mutual understanding of 
requirements and capabilities. 
8. Procure goods and services with "Best Value" techniques 
• Reduce the time and cost of making the award. 
• Use past performance as a key factor. 
• Debrief offerors promptly and openly to avoid misunderstanding 
and protest. 
9. Test and Inspect in the least obtrusive manner to add value to the 
process or product 
• Make testers/evaluators value added team participants from the 
start. 
• Achieve quality with statistical process control rather than with end 
item inspection. 
• Take advantage of contractor testing. 
10. Manage contracts for end results 
• Focus on the customer and the product or service required. 
• Aggregate contracts and acquisition phases to benefit from stable 
contractor operations. 
• Operate on the basis of trust and tailor oversight to estimated 
performance risk. 
• Acquire technical data rights only to the extent necessary for 
breakout and spares procurement. 
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IV. UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ACQUISITION 
PROCESS ACTION TEAM PAT REPORT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Chapter II presented the origin, roles, mission and organization of USSOCOM. In 
addition, it described SOAC's (Special Operations Acquisition Center) role in the 
acquisition of SO-peculiar items for SOF (Special Operations Forces). In Chapter III, 
acquisition reform initiatives of the past decade were presented. The primary intent of 
acquisition reform is to streamline the acquisition process to ensure that the warfi.ghter 
receives the highest quality equipment at the best possible price in a timely manner. The 
Packard Commission Final Report was described in detail because it served as the basis 
for all acquisition reform initiatives that followed it. The OSD A-PAT was also 
thoroughly reviewed because of the significant impact that it has had on the acquisition 
oversight and review process within DoD, reflected in the rewrite of the DoD 5000 in 
March 1996. The purpose of this chapter is to summarize the contents of the February 
1996 USSOCOM Acquisition Management Process Action Team (A-PAT) Final 
Report/Implementation Plan, including the charter, the problems the A-PAT identified in 
the USSOCOM acquisition process and the recommendations of the A-PAT. The 
contents of this report/implementation plan are crucial because many of the A-PAT 
recommendations have been implemented into USSOCOM's acquisition process, which 
is the focal point of this thesis. 
The USSOCOM A-PAT was comprised of 12 members (eight civilians and four 
military), including representatives from the SOAC Investment Division (SD-1); SOAC 
Policy Division (SD-P); PEO, Maritime and Rotary (PEO-MR); Directorate of 
Procurement (SOKO); Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization (SOSB); Command 
Engineering (SOEN); Directorate of C41 (J6); Directorate of Resources Comptroller 
Division (J8-C); Directorate of Resources Program (J8-P); USASOC; AFSOC and 
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NA VSPECW ARC OM. In addition, the board was led and directed by the Director of the 
Operations Review Board.125 
B. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
The A-PAT Final Report/Implementation Plan of the A-PAT includes an 
executive summary, implementation plans for their recommendations and annexes which 
include the A-PAT charter, the acquisition process problems identified by the A-PAT, 
inputs from the Services and flow charts reflecting the USSOCOM acquisition process. 
This section will provide specific details of the A-PAT charter, the problems the A-PAT 
identified in the acquisition process, the recommendations of the A-PAT and the 
subsequent decisions made by the EQB on those recommendations. It closes out with a 
brief summary of the issues that the A-PAT identified but were unable to address. 
1. A-PAT Charter 
The charter for the A-PAT, which met from 6 July 1995 to 5 November 1995, was 
signed by the USCINCSOC, General Wayne A. Downing, on 5 July 1995. The purpose 
of the A-PAT, as stated in paragraph (1) of the charter, was to " .. .improve the HQ 
USSOCOM Acquisition Management Process."126 In order to accomplish this task, the 
charter directed the A-PAT to flow chart the existing acquisition process, including 
headquarters directorates, USSOCOM Components and Service materiel developers. It 
also directed the A-PAT to identify process and policy changes required to improve the 
process and to flow chart the reengineered acquisition process. In addition, the PAT was 
required to submit an implementation schedule and recommend metrics which could be 
used to measure the process of their recommended changes. 
The charter also listed specific problems identified by the Executive Quality 
Board (EQB) which led to the establishment of the USSOCOM A-PAT. A summarized 
list of those problems follows: 
125 USSOCOM A-PAT Final Report/Implementation Plan, (Feb 19, 1996), p. 29. 
126 Ibid., Annex A, p. 1. 
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• The interfaces required in the acquisition process between the headquarters 
staff, Component commands and the acquisition staff were unclear. 
• The supplier/customer relationship between the Board of Directors and SOAC 
needed to be clarified. 
• The transition of materiel systems from acquisition to sustainment and/or 
evolutionary upgrade needed clarification. 
• The specific supplier/customer relationship between the SOJ8 (Programmers 
and Comptrollers) and SOAC needed to be improved to reduce redundancy, 
clarify responsibilities, realign manpower and streamline the process. 
• The funding methodology and oversight of Service-managed programs. 
• The involvement of directorate and staff functions that interface with the 
acquisition process needed to be identified, defmed, quantified and considered 
as part of the process. 
• The role ofheadquarters staff personnel on IPTs needed to be clarified.127 
2. Acquisition Process Problems Identified by the A-PAT 
The four phases of the A-PAT were process definition and process problem 
identification, process problem refinement and identification of causes, solution 
exploration with options for each major interface identified in the charter and final report 
preparation and implementation of Executive Quality Board (EQB) decisions. 128 During 
the first phase of the process, A-PAT members identified dozens of perceived problems 
with the USSOCOM acquisition process. Using TQL techniques, the list was 
consolidated and prioritized into a list of 17 problems which was representative of all that 
had been discussed. 129 The bulletized list of the 17 problems identified and briefed to the 
EQB is as follows: 
• SOSD-1, J8-CI have overlapping roles. 
• PEO vs. Assessment Director role in fmancial management in execution year. 
127 1bid., Annex A, pp. 2-3. 
128 Ibid., p. 1. 
129 1bid., p. 29. 
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• Perceived duplication of responsibilities between PEOs, Financial Analysts 
and SOSD-IF. 
• SOAC perceives over zealous staff interference with acquisition functions. 
• Division of funding authority/responsibility is unclear throughout the 
acquisition process. 
• Degree of oversight in managing funds in year of execution is unclear. 
• Out-of-cycle funding process is broken. 
• Inadequate control in Service-managed, Service MDA programs.** 
• User out of loop while making acquisition decisions. 
• Staff lacks "teamwork" mentality. 
• Failure to meet OSD obligations and outlay goals. 
• Transition system of Mission Need Statement (MNS) to acquisition IS 
undefined. 
• Acquisition strategies do not adequately address long term sustainment. 
• Improper routing of direct procurement actions.** 
• Cancellation process for programs is unclear or undefined. 
• Inaccurate planning and budget estimates lead to unexecutable programs. 
• Sub-optimal distribution of manpower within SOAC.130 
** Problems were not addressed because of time constraints. 
In addition to the 17 listed, the A-PAT identified two other process areas that 
required further analysis. They are: 
• The roles of the C41 (J6) and Acquisition Executive (AE) in the acquisition of 
certain systems. 
• Establishment of a policy to oversee the expenditure of MFP-11 O&M funds 
by the Components on equipment and equipment support. 131 
130 Ibid., Annex B, pp. 2-3. 
131 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
58 
3. A-PAT Recommendations 
The A-PAT developed and briefed their recommendations to the EQB in four 
distinct areas; Requirements Interface and J8/SOAC Interface, both of which contained 
multiple recommendations, and Assessment Director/ AE Interface and Component/ AE 
Interface. In the A-PAT Final Report/Implementation Plan, each recommendation 
included a discussion, the EQB decision and the mechanics of implementation. The A-
pAT determined that the recommendations they provided could potentially resolve all but 
two of the 17 problems which they originally briefed to the EQB. Those problems, which 
were not resolved because of time constraints, are annotated on the list above. The 
remainder of the chapter will focus on the recommendations made by the A-PAT to the 
EQB. The recommendations in the first three areas were adopted by the EQB and an 
alternative course of action was decided for the Component/ AE Interface 
recommendation. 
a) Requirements Interface Implementation Plan 
The A-PAT developed four recommendations to improve the requirements 
interface process within USSOCOM. The flow chart in figure 4.1 displays the 
requirements interface process after the implementation of the A-PAT recommendations 
(the sections highlighted in gray reflect the additional steps in the process). 
(1) Implementation ofUSSOCOM Integrated Product Teams 
(IPTs) 
(a) Discussion 
The primary benefit of an IPT is that it brings the major 
stakeholders of programs together to make decisions as a team rather than as 
individuals. In addition, they involve HQ staff more closely with the user submitting the 
document. A central theme of acquisition reform is streamlining the acquisition process. 
IPTs accomplish this not only by potentially reducing the time it takes for involved 
stakeholders to concur on program decisions, but also because they facilitate flexibility, 
innovation and tailoring within the program. To ensure that key players are involved early 
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-in the process, A-PAT recommended the formation of IPTs upon receipt of an 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) or a Mission Need Statement (MNS).132 
(b) EQB Decision 
The EQB concurred with the recommendation to form IPTs 
upon receipt of a requirements document. 133 
(c) Mechanics of Implementation 
Upon receipt of a requirements document, J5 Requirement 
(J5-R) appoints a Program Requirements Officer (PRO) to establish and lead a working 
level Requirements IPT (R-IPT). Once the requirement is sufficiently defined, receives a 
favorable recommendation from the Requirements Review Board (RRB) (Chapter V will 
describe the responsibilities of the RRB) and is approved by CINCSOC, the requirement 
is forwarded to the Special Operations Acquisition Executive (SOAE) for entry into the 
acquisition system. Once accepted, the IPT lead is handed off to the SOAC and is 
referred to as a Program IPT (P-IPT), lead by either a Systems Acquisition Manager 
(SAM) (if Service managed) or PM (if USSOCOM managed). 134 
The size of the R-IPT is based on the scope of the project 
being initiated. Members of the R-IPT include but are not limited to USSOCOM J-Staff 
personnel, including the Comptroller and Logistics staffs, Service representatives and 
User representatives. Additionally, the R-IPT is advised by the Assessment Directors, 
who provide priority within the scope of the Capabilities Based Program List (CBPL) and 
potential for inclusion in the Resource Constrained Capabilities Based Program List 
(RCCBPL) (Chapter V will describe the purpose of the CBPL and RCCBPL). Prior to 
converting over to a P-IPT, the R-IPT develops a command position relative to the goals 
and objectives of the USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process (SPP) (Chapter V will 
discuss the SPP), confirms that non-material solutions do not exist, recommends joint 




applicability and refme the requirement using the results of studies and trade-off analysis. 
Establishment ofiPTs was scheduled for 1 March 1996.135 
(2) USSOCOM Encourage the Use of an ORD Where Practical 
for Command Review/ Approval of a Materiel Need. 
(a) Discussion 
Because many USSOCOM requirements can be satisfied 
using non-developmental (NDI), commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or Government-off-
the-shelf(GOTS) items, the A-PAT determined that an ORD, rather than a MNS, would 
be the appropriate requirement document to submit when those items are available. 
Adopting this practice would put USSOCOM in line with acquisition reform and DoD 
direction. Benefits of adopting this procedure include more accurate cost estimates and 
funding profiles and a reduction in the amount of documentation required of MNS/ORD 
authors. 136 
(b) EQB Decision 
The EQB agreed that ORDs should be used as the 
requirement submission document when the solution to the materiel deficiency is an NDI, 
COTS or GOTS item.137 
(c) Mechanics of Implementation 
Beginning 1 March 1996, requirement sponsors were 
encouraged to submit ORDs to 15-R to defme requirements and initiate programs when 
those requirements could be satisfied using NDI, COTS or GOTS items. The ORD 
should include the special operations forces (SOF) mission area and tasks that can be 
approved, explain the alternatives that were reviewed and describe the process used to 
develop performance requirements. The remaining portion of the ORD is written using 
the format provided in USSOCOM Directive 70-2.138 
135 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
136 Ibid., p. 7. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid., p. 8. 
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(3) Cost Analysis of Newly Identified Requirements 
(a) Discussion 
Prior to transitioning a requirement to the SOAE, a more 
detailed examination of costs was necessary. Therefore, the A-PAT recommended that 
the Directorate of Resources Comptroller Division (J8-C) validate the costs for the Board 
of Directors (BOD) (Chapter V will describe the responsibilities of the BOD) prior to 
submitting the program for approval on the RCCBL.139 
(b) EQB Decision 
The EQB concurred with this recommendation and directed 
that the cost verification by J8-C occur after the requirement has been validated by the 
RRB and approved by CINCSOC, each of which occur prior to approval by the BOD and 
inclusion on the RCCBPL.140 
(c) Mechanics of Implementation 
The J8-C Investment Branch (J8-CI) will be required to 
perform initial verifications of cost estimates prepared by ORD sponsors. As a member of 
the R-IPT, a J8-C Cost branch (J8-CC) cost estimator then performs a sufficiency 
review that addresses the completeness, reasonableness, consistency and documentation 
of the ORD on a J8-CC sufficiency review form. To assure timely acceptance of ORD 
estimates, J8-CC works with ORD sponsors prior to their initial submittal. ORDs which 
contain insufficient estimates are returned to the sponsors for revision. This process was 
implemented on 1 March 1996.141 
(4) Requirements (J5) to Acquisition (AE) Process 
(a) Discussion 
Recognizing the need to formalize the J5-R to SOAE 
requirement hand off process, the A-PAT recommended that a program entering the 
1391bid. 
140 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
141 Ibid., p. 9. 
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acquisition process should already be validated and approved, prioritized, costed, funded 
and contain specific start guidance.142 
(b) EQB Decision 
The EQB concurred that requirements handed off by the 
Directorate of Plans, Policy and Strategic Assessment (J5/7) to the SOAC should meet 
the criteria listed in sub-paragraph 4 (a). 143 
(c) Mechanics of Implementation 
Effective 1 March 1996, ORDs and MNSs which have 
completed the requirements generation, review and approval processes are passed from 
the J517 to the SOAE along with a memorandum that summarizes the recommendations 
of those processes. As a minimum the memorandum includes recommendations for joint 
applicability, the sponsoring Commander's priority, placement on the USSOCOM 
RCCBPL, sufficiency of the cost estimates and additional guidance from CINCSOC 
and/or the BOD.144 
b) JBISOAC Interface Implementation Plan 
The A-PAT developed three recommendations to improve the J8/SOAC 
interface. 
(1) J8-CI Matrixed Budget Support to PEOs 
(a) Discussion 
The A-PAT recommended the matrixing of four Investment 
Budget Analysts from the J8-C Investment Branch (J8-CI) to SOAC. This 
recommendation was based on workload surveys, interviews with SOAC management 
and process work flow reviews. The intent of this recommendation was to improve the 
relationship between the J8 and SOAC, eliminate unnecessary checking, expedite the 
1421bid. 
143 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
144 1bid., p. 10. 
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funds distribution process and include J8 in the day-to-day management of the acquisition 
programs. 145 
(b) EQB Decision 
The EQB concurred with the recommendation and directed 
the placement of a Budget Analysts within each PEO organization. These individuals 
remain under the control of the J8 for personnel purposes, but are located in the PEO 
work area an appropriate amount of time to handle the workload.146 
(c) Mechanics of Implementation 
The matrixed Budget Analysts (GS 12/13 or 0-4/5) were 
in place by 1 March 1996 and are responsible to the PEO for the following: 
• Advising the PEO on status of availability and execution of funds and areas of 
interest or concern by the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller (USD C) 
or the USSOCOM staff. 
• Assisting in the reconciliation of accounting records, resolving accounting 
problems and processing documentation through J8-C, SOKO and the 
Defense Accounting Office (DAO). 
• Conducting final quality reviews of all documentation to minimize review 
required by J8-C. 
As stated previously, the Budget Analysts remain assigned 
to the J8-C for personnel purposes, however, the PEOs do provide letters of input to the 
rating official. 147 
(2) Removal ofSD-I from PAIMIPR/AF Form 9 Processing 
(a) Discussion 
The A-PAT recommended eliminating the SOAC 
Investment Division's (SOAC/SD-I) responsibility for processing Program Authorization 
(P A), Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) and Purchase Request 
145 Ibid., p. 15. 
1461bid. 
147 1bid., p. 16. 
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(PR)(AF Form 9) documents. They anticipated that the PEO Financial Analyst/J8-CI 
Budget Analyst arrangement would produce quality documents that could be processed 
directly through J8-C channels without additional assistance, thus enabling SD-1 to 
perform enhanced analytical and integration functions for the AE.148 
(b) EQB Decision 
The EQB concurred with this recommendation, citing 
anticipated productivity increases and improvements in the review/approval process.149 
(c) Mechanics of Implementation 
Effective 1 March 1996, PEO Financial Analysts, in 
collaboration with their matrixed Budget Analysts, began processing, reviewing and 
coordinating the distribution of AF Form 9's, MIPRs and PAs.150 
(3) Team Approach on All Collateral Financial Duties 
(a) Discussion 
The A-PAT determined that a number of overlaps occurred 
in the fmancial processes that SD-1, J2, J3, J4, J5 J6 and J8 participated in. Those 
processes are: POM Submissions, Budget Submissions, Reprogramming Actions, Fund 
Rescissions, Program Budget Decision (PBD) Reclames and Execution Analysis. They 
recommended developing a team concept to improve these processes, agreeing that each 
of them is "owned" by these organizations at different points and that the process 
"owner" at any particular point should serve as the team leader. 151 
(b) EQB Decision 
The EQB concurred with the teamwork approach 
recommended by the A-PAT and directed that principals from both J8 and AE work 
concurrently to ensure the successful implementation of the process.152 
148 Ibid., p. 17. 
149 Ibid., p. 18. 
ISO Ibid. 
151 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 
152 Ibid., p. 19. 
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(c) Mechanics of Implementation 
Effective 1 March 1996, J8 became responsible for 
assisting the SOAC by providing the expertise to complete the POM and budget exhibits 
for the acquisition team. The following table was developed to determine team 









SOAC, J8-P, J4, J8-C, J5-AD 
SOAC, J8-C, J4 
SOAC, J8-C, J5-AD 
SOAC, J5-AD, J8 
SOAC, J8 
SOAC, J8-C, J5-AD 
* J2 and J6 are team members when their interests are effected.153 
c) Assessment Director/AE Interface Implementation Plan 
(1) Funding Authority in Year of Execution and Budget Years 
(a) Discussion 
Because of significant problems related to the duplication 
and conflict of assigned roles in the acquisition processes, the A-PAT recommended a 
clearer definition of the Assessment Directors (AD) role, including the establishment of 
parameters for AD involvement.154 
(b) EQB Decision 
The EQB decided that PEOs would be empowered to make 
funding moves without AD approval, as long as criteria acceptable to the AE and J5 are 
met. In all cases however, the AD is informed. If the criteria are not met, ADs will assess 
and make recommendations for a BOD decision. If the adjustment is for less than $5 
153 Ibid. 
154 Ibid., p. 21. 
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million, the EQB authorized the J5 unilateral approval of the adjustment without the 
BOD's approval. ISS 
(c) Mechanics of Implementation 
Beginning 1 March 1996, PEOs were empowered to realign 
and/or reprogram funds among approved, funded programs on the RCCBPL, without 
prior coordination of the J5, if the change met the following criteria: 
• The total increase to any program is less than $5 million in any execution or 
budget year, per fiscal year. 
• There is less than a six-month slip or acceleration in any of the affected 
programs. 
• There is no change in the BOD approved total inventory objective. 
• There is no effect on manpower. 
• There is no breach of performance threshold. 
Funding changes that effect programs that are not funded 
on the RCCBPL, or do not meet the above criteria, require J5/7 coordination.156 The flow 
charts in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 reflect the fund realignment decision process. 
d) Component/A£ Interface Implementation Plan 
(1) Component Acquisition Manpower to USSOCOM 
(a) Discussion 
The management of the Major Force Program 11 (MFP-11) 
investment account was consolidated by CINSOC at HQ USSOCOM under the AE. This 
prompted the A-PAT to study the option of moving the USASOC and AFSOC positions 
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Historically USSOCOM' s acquisition organization has 
dealt with unattained manpower goals. The 88 personnel provided when the organization 
originally stood up fell well short of the 130 requested. The majority of the personnel 
(77) were assigned to the SOAC (previously referred to as the Special Operations 
Research, Development and Acquisition Center (SORDAC)). Today there are 118 
acquisition positions (32 Military, 86 civilian) at USSOCOM.157 
The A-PAT originally recommended not to move any 
component acquisition manpower to HQ USSOCOM. This decision was based on A-PAT 
briefmgs with the components who argued that these individuals were primarily subject 
matter experts (SMEs) who also served as focal points for non MFP-11 programs, and 
were too critical to lose to HQ.158 
(b) EQB Guidance 
Knowing that the sizes of the USASOC and AFSOC 
acquisition organizations had not changed since USSOCOM began to centrally manage 
the MFP-11 investment account, the EQB reasoned that those Components should 
provide some acquisition related staff to HQ USSOCOM to perform Systems Acquisition 
Manager (SAM) duties for the AE. They directed the A-PAT to work with the SOAC and 
J5 manpower to determine the number of personnel and methodology for accomplishing 
the manpower shift. Three recommendations were briefed to the EQB based on subjective 
analysis of the research the A-PAT had conducted: 
• Move eight positions from USASOC Deputy Chief of Staff, Resources 
Integration (DCSRI) and AFSOC Directorate of Plans, Policies and Programs 
(XPQ) to the headquarters, reprioritize with HQ USSOCOM for an additional 
six positions and POM for the remaining eight slots. 
• Move eight positions from USASOC and AFSOC and Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM) for the remaining 14. 
157 Phone interview between Ms. Christa Ward, SOSD, USSOCOM, Tampa, Florida and author 26 
November 1996. 
158 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 
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• Move all acquisition positions from USASOC and AFSOC to HQ 
USSOCOM.159 
(c) EQB Decision 
The EQB rejected each of the three recommendations based 
on the subjective nature which they were developed. Instead, they directed the AE to 
promulgate policy which defmes the acquisition roles of HQ USSOCOM and the 
Components, and directed J5 to conduct an expedited manpower study of the component 
acquisition organizations and the AE. The EQB' s intent was to develop an objective basis 
for moving component acquisition positions to HQ USSOCOM, and an objective basis to 
enter any remaining AE manpower deficits into the FY 1998 POM.160 
(d) Mechanics of Implementation 
The AE and J 5 were directed to finish their assigned tasks 
as soon as possible in order to compute AE manpower requirements into the FY 1998 
POM.t6t 
4. Unaddressed Issues 
a) How USSOCOM Oversees Service Managed Programs 
The Military Deputy to the Acquisition Executive (MDAE) and one of the 
PEOs briefed the A-PAT and advocated more autonomy and a more stable funding 
environment for the Service program manager (PM). The MDAE felt that incorporating 
these recommendations would negate the requirement to move component acquisition 
personnel to USSOCOM. Citing poor cost, schedule and performance results of Service 
managed SOF programs, stemming from lack of Service priority and flag level visibility, 
the A-PAT rejected the concept. Additional problems cited by the A-PAT, including 
resistance by the Service PMs to provide acceptable memoranda of agreements (MOAs) 
(Chapter V will describe MOAs), Acquisition Program Baselines (APBs) and regular 
program reports, reinforced their position and actually led the A-PAT to recommend 
159 Ibid., pp. 26-27. 
160 Ibid., p. 27. 
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increasing scrutiny of Service-managed programs. Their recommendations include that 
the AE retain milestone decision authority (MDA) over more Service-managed programs 
and that the AE increase ties with Service flag officers at program management 
organizations. Because this issue required a more in-depth review, the A-PAT 
recommendations were not briefed to the EQB.162 
b) Acquisition and Oversight Processes of Intelligence Systems 
Although the management and fmancial oversight of Intelligence systems 
acquisitions such as SOCRATES and ASOCNET were provided by the AE, other 
systems, such as SCAMPI and the Command Local Area Network (LAN), were being 
acquired, enhanced, operated and maintained under J6 management. Despite J6 
management, the AE remained fiscally accountable for the execution of those funds. The 
A-PAT recommend a follow up study to deconflict the situation.163 
c) Development of a Command O&M Policy 
When Congress raised the minimum threshold for purchases requiring 
procurement funds to $100,000, a difficult situation was made even worse. Because 
components could legally purchase equipment using O&M dollars, O&M purchases 
already exceeded USSOCOM's investment funds. The A-PAT felt that USSOCOM 
needed an O&M policy to ward off deterioration of standard obligation and CINCSOC 
control, but because they lacked time and the issue was beyond their charter, no 
recommendations were provided.164 
C. SUMMARY 
This chapter summarized the contents of the USSOCOM Acquisition 
Management Process Action Team (A-PAT) Final Report/Implementation Plan. It 
includes specific direction the A-PAT received in its charter, the problems which the A-
pAT identified, eight recommendations they briefed to the EQB to improve the 
161 Ibid. 
162 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 
163 Ibid., p. 34. 
1641bid. 
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Requirements, J8/SOAC, Assessment Director/ AE and Component interfaces in the 
acquisition process and important issues which require additional attention. The intent of 
each of these recommendations was to streamline and improve USSOCOM's acquisition 
process. In the next chapter, the process will be described and we will see how the A-
pAT recommendations and acquisition reform initiatives of the past decade have been 
incorporated. 
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V. UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND ACQUISITION 
PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to review the acquisition process at 
USSOCOM and to analyze whether the process follows the intent of acquisition reform 
initiatives from the past decade. In addition, recommendations to improve USSOCOM's 
acquisition process will also be provided. Chapter III listed and provided background on 
the major reform initiatives and Chapter IV listed the recommendations provided by the 
USSOCOM A-PAT to streamline and improve USSOCOM's acquisition process. The 
purpose of this chapter is to describe the existing acquisition process. 
Throughout Chapter IV, a number of terms which were contained in the 
recommendations of the A-PAT were annotated "Chapter V will provide further 
description." Since each of these terms are associated with the acquisition process, they 
will be described in the first section of this chapter. The second section describes the 
responsibilities of USSOCOM Components and HQ Directorate staffs in the acquisition 
process and the third section will describe USSOCOM's acquisition process. Rather than 
simply being a rewrite of USSOCOM Directive 70-1, USSOCOM Acquisition 
Management Procedures, this section will summarize the key points and provide 
sufficient details to formulate an opinion on USSOCOM's compliance with acquisition 
reform initiatives. Those opinions, and any recommendations to make USSOCOM more 
compliant with acquisition reform initiatives are presented in Chapter 6. 
B. KEY TERMS/CONCEPTS IN THE USSOCOM ACQUISITION PROCESS 
1. Acquisition Program Baseline (APB) 
USSOCOM programs utilize the APB described in DoD 5000.2-R. Developed 
during Phase 0 and reviewed and updated throughout the program acquisition life cycle, 
they contain performance, schedule and cost information and contribute to program 
stability. Program baselines and changes for USSOCOM managed programs are made by 
the USSOCOM Milestone Decision Authority (MDA), while the Service MDA and the 
75 
SOAE or USSOCOM PEO must jointly approve baselines and changes for Service-
managed programs. All proposed baseline changes are coordinated with J3, J4 and JS/7. 165 
2. Program Specific Memoranda of Agreement (PSMOA) 
When a Service or agency agrees to manage a SO-peculiar acquisition program, a 
PSMOA between USSOCOM and that activity is drafted. As the name implies, PSMOAs 
are tailored to meet the needs of specific programs, however, they each specify such 
information as program roles and responsibilities, the MDA and the program's 
acquisition category (ACAT). PSMOAs can also be used for USSOCOM managed 
programs to acquire additional functional support from developing activities, laboratories 
and test agencies. 166 
3. Strategic Planning Process (SPP) 
Strategic Planning is one of four core processes at USSOCOM. The others are 
Operations Support, Resourcing and Acquisition. The objective of the Strategic Planning 
Process is "to provide a list of capabilities-based programs, over a range of constraints, 
that allows POM decision makers to satisfy SOF mission needs and proactively guide the 
development of SOF resources in the future."167 The SPP generates products which serve 
as the foundation for developing the USSOCOM POM, including the USSOCOM 
Prioritized-Required .. Capabilities List (P-RCL), USSOCOM Strategic Planning 
Guidance (SPG), Capabilities Based Program List (CBPL) and the Resource Constrained 
Capabilities Based Program List (RCCBPL).168 
4. Requirements Generation System (RGS) 
The USSOCOM RGS establishes procedures and assigns responsibilities for 
identifying, documenting, validating and approving SO-peculiar equipment and materiel 
requirements that may require an acquisition program. USSOCOM Directive 70-2, 
Requirements Generation System, Special Operations-Peculiar Equipment and Materiel, 
165 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, pp. 27-28. 
166 Ibid., p. 27. 
167 USSOCOM Acquisition Management Training Course, pp. 50-51. 
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integrates arid implements the provisions of the DoD 5000 documents and the policies 
and procedures of the CJCSI Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 77, Requirements 
Generation System, and describes the system as it operates within USSOCOM.169 
USSOCOM's RGS is diagrammed in Figure 5.1. 
5. Board of Directors (BOD) 
The USSOCOM BOD is the decision making body for the SPP. The BOD is 
comprised of the USCINCSOC, Assistant Secretary of Defense/Special Operations Low 
Intensity Conflict (ASD/SO-LIC) and the commanders of AFSOC, USASOC, 
NA VSPECW ARC OM and JSOC. They continually review and evaluate materiel 
requirements within the SPP to establish capability priorities and allocate resources.170 
6. Capabilities Based Program List (CBPL) 
The CBPL is generated by the Assessment Directors (ADs) and is the prioritized 
list of each O&M, Procurement and RDT &E funding requirement within USSOCOM.171 
7. Resource Constrained Capabilities Based Program List (RCCBPL) 
The RCCBPL is basically the same as the CBPL however it reflects those 
programs that will be funded based on USSOCOM's total obligational authority. 172 
8. Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) Acquisition 
Management Information System (P AMIS) 
P AMIS is a database that serves as the mainstay of the oversight system utilized 
by SOAC that consolidates USSOCOM acquisition program information for the SOAE, 
USCINCSOC and DoD. Updated monthly, it includes program assessments, schedules 
168 USSOCOM Directive 70-2, Requirements Generation System, Special Operations-Peculiar Equipment 
and Materiel, (21 June 1996), p. 4. 
169 Ibid., p. 2. 
170 Ibid. 
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and budgets of every USSOCOM acquisition program. Specific information found in 
the P AMIS database includes the program ID, program title, SAM/PM name, analyst 
name, acquisition organization, proponent (e.g., AFSOC), ACAT (acquisition category), 
program type (e.g., acquisition program, evolutionary acquisition and designated 
procurement) and the PEO. 
9. Special Operations Acquisition Board (SOAB) 
The SOAB is a formal body comprised of the Component Commanders (as 
required), USSOCOM Directors (described later in this chapter) and the SOAE (as the 
MDA) that advises the MDA through periodic review of program status and progress at 
milestone decision points. The Military Deputy to the Acquisition Executive (MDAE) or 
PEO may serve as the SOAB Chairman and MDA if delegated by the SOAE. It is the 
forum for milestone decision reviews when the MDA resides at USSOCOM, for 
Executive Program Reviews (EPRs) when the MDA resides elsewhere and for EPRs of 
USSOCOM and Service-managed programs between milestone decision points. A SOAB 
milestone review is held for all ACAT IC and ACAT II programs. In addition, milestone 
reviews for ACAT III and IV programs are conducted by a convening SOAB using a 
streamlined review process. For ACAT ID programs, an EPR is held several months 
prior to the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), the decision making forum for ACAT ID 
programs. This review is necessary to establish the USSOCOM inputs into the milestone 
decision process. The results of SOAB reviews are presented to the MDA for 
consideration.173 
10. Requirements Review Board (RRB) 
The RRB meets quarterly to review and develop USSOCOM's positions on 
mission needs and operational requirements, modernization strategies, technology 
strategies and Component and JSOC Commanders' priorities relative to mission utility in 
consonance with the SPP. To assist in developing these positions, the RRB charters both 
R-IPTs and Special Study Groups. The RRB is comprised of the J5/7 as the RRB 
173 USSOCOM Directive 70-3, Special Operations Acquisition Board Procedures, (25 June 1993), p. 3. 
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Chairman, USSOCOM Deputy Directors of J2, 13, J4, J6, J7 and J8, USSOCOM 
Directors of SOAC and the Command Oversight Review Board (CORB), Theater SOC 
(TSOC) Commanders or their designated representatives and associate members from J1 
and J7.t74 
11. Program Management Allocation Criteria (PMAC) 
Since the organization of USSOCOM, determining the best way to provide 
management oversight of acquisition programs has continually been an issue. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the SOAE has the option of managing programs in-house 
using SOAC resources or designating a Service or agency to manage the program. This is 
done through a program specific memorandum of agreement (PSMOA) between 
USSOCOM and the designated Service. The PSMOA describes the responsibilities, 
procedures and relationships ofUSSOCOM and the Service or agency throughout the life 
of the program. 175 
A PMAC study is accomplished by the PEO as early as possible during Phase 0 to 
determine if an acquisition program should be managed by the Services or USSOCOM. If 
Service management is recommended and then approved by the SOAE, the PSMOA is 
developed.176 
The PMAC study process is based on the recommendations of a 1993 USSOCOM 
staff study which convened to determine what evaluation criteria should be used to 
determine if USSOCOM should manage an acquisition program. The study team 
developed its recommendations based on the following assumptions and facts: 
a) Assumptions 
• USSOCOM will program manage "in-house" by exception. 
• USSOCOM is willing to assume more risk by streamlining the acquisition 
process to meet operational requirements. 
174 USSOCOM Directive 70-2, pp. B1-B2. 
175 Sherry Angleton, Bob Batchelor, Mark Rabinowitz, Charlie Stevens and Larry Wheeler, USSOCOM 
Staff Study, Program Management Allocation Criteria (PMAC), (December 1993), p. 1. 
176 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, p. 26. 
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• USSOCOM will not manage ACAT I programs "in-house." 
• USSOCOM will not manage a program "in-house" unless there is value added 
by doing so. 
• USSOCOM will not manage full developmental programs "in-house" (this is 
precluded by available resources). 
b) Facts Bearing on the Issue 
• USCINCSOC, as Head of Agency (HOA), is responsible for the development 
and acquisition of SO-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies and services. 
Title 10, US Code, does not preclude USSOCOM from managing acquisition 
programs. 
• Every SOF acquisition program is unique. 
• SOAC is not resourced to manage acquisition programs. 
• USSOCOM program management requires external support. 
• The Services are not always responsive to SO-peculiar requirements and 
acquisition management procedures. 
• Most SO-peculiar acquisitions are relatively low cost, low risk, NDI type 
programs. 
• USSOCOM materiel requirement priorities are different than the Services. 
• USSOCOM has the capability to streamline the acquisition process because of 
collocation of key decision makers and less staff layering than is found in the 
Services acquisition systems.177 
c) Allocation Criteria 
The allocation criteria recommendations of the study team were 
incorporated into USSOCOM Directive 70-1. Figure 5.2 is the decision matrix used for 
a PMAC study. If the result of the matrix is greater than zero, the recommendation to 
the SOAE would be for the Service to manage the program. If it less than zero, the 
recommendation would be to manage the program in-house. The critical feature of this 
177 USSOCOM PMAC Staff Study, pp. 3-4. 
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matrix is the weighting factor assigned to each criteria by the PEO. Although 
precise values for each of the allocation criteria are difficult to assess, 178 the PEO 
conducting the PMAC study will have the experience and program knowledge necessary 
to make a decision in the best interest of USSOCOM and the Service in question. A brief 
description of the criteria is as follows: 
• Schedule Requirements: Is the delivery schedule compressed? Can/will 
the Service meet this schedule? 
• Management Costs: Are Service management and overhead costs 
reasonable? Can USSOCOM manage cheaper? 
• Complexity: Is the program very complex from a management perspective · 
or does the technical complexity require special consideration? 
• Resource Requirements: What are the manning and facilities requirements? 
• Expertise: Is the required expertise in SOAC or in the Service/agencies? 
• Intangibles: Are there any other program-unique elements to consider (e.g., 
joint program, multi-national or Congressional Interest)?179 
12. Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) 
The MDA is the individual designated in accordance with criteria established by 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology to approve entry of an 
acquisition program into the next phase. 180 The MDA for USSOCOM programs depends 
on the ACAT and the activity that manages the program (i.e., USSOCOM or Service-
Managed). Figure 5.3 describes ACAT thresholds and shows the MDA for USSOCOM 
and Service-managed programs. It is important to understand that when MDA is with the 
Service, the program office within the Service (e.g., NA VSEASYSCOM for some 
Navy managed programs), not the USSOCOM Component (USASOC, 
NA VSPECW ARCOM, AFSOC and JSOC) will execute MDA responsibilities for the 
program. In addition, the SOAE is the MDA for all Milestone 0 decisions. 
178 Ibid., p. 6. 
179 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, p. G-1. 
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13. Urgent Deployment Acquisitions 
Occasionally a requirement surfaces that IS so urgent it must be fielded 
immediately. This type of requirement is submitted as a Combat MNS. Once the Combat 
MNS is approved by USCINCSOC and passed to the SOAE, a PEO or one of the 
Services materiel developers is selected to acquire and field the requirement. 181 Since this 
is an out of cycle requirement, funding is provided by shifting funds out of existing 
programs (which are subsequently reimbursed). Once the ADs approve the funding shifts 
recommended by the SOAC, a program authorization is signed. 
C. ACQillSITION ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Chapter II described the SOAC organization and summarized the roles and 
responsibilities of the SOAE, the RD&A and Procurement Directorates and the PEOs. 
The purpose of this section is to describe the role of other key personnel and 
organizations involved in USSOCOM's acquisition process. 
1. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low 
Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO!LIC)) 
ASD (SO/LIC) serves an oversight role in USSOCOM's acquisition process. To 
facilitate this role, ASD (SO/LIC) is a member on the USSOCOM BOD, RRB, EIPT and 
SOAB and is involved in the POM process.182 
2. Military Deputy to the Acquisition Executive (MDAE)/Director 
ofRD&A 
Chapter II described the responsibilities of the RD&A Directorate, comprised of 
the Advanced Concepts, Acquisition Policy and Logistics, Management Operations and 
Financial Analysis and Program Integration Divisions. The Director of RD&A is also the 
MDAE, and as such is Chairman of the Executive Integrated Product Team (E-IPT) and 
serves the vital role of resolving issues and coordinating actions with Service Acquisition 
Executive staffs, PEOs and materiel developers. The MDAEIRD&A Director is also 
responsible for managing the Advanced Concepts Division which oversees technology 
181 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, p. 27. 
182 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, p. 11. 
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development projects for USSOCOM. The three other divisions in the RD&A Directorate 
are managed by the Deputy Director of RD&A. 
Additional responsibilities of the MDAE/Director of RD&A include establishing 
P AMIS policies, procedures and maintenance objectives, conducting annual (or as 
required) Program Management Reviews (PMRs) and Financial Execution Reviews on 
all acquisition and technology development programs and supporting the PPBS by 
coordinating with the PEOs, J8 (Directorate of Resources) and the Assessment Directors 
(ADs) to ensure accurate cost and schedule data are included for POM and budget 
documentation for acquisition programs.183 
3. Deputy Director RD&A 
In addition to managing the Acquisition Policy and Logistics, Management 
Operations and Financial Analysis and Program Integration Divisions, the Deputy 
Director of RD&A has many responsibilities associated with P AMIS, including data 
administration, establishing business rules and priorities, maintaining the operating 
instruction and coordinating SOAC participation in the use and maintenance of the 
system. The Deputy Director also represents or participates with the SOAE or the PEOs 
at industry, Service and DoD conferences to develop plans affecting assigned acquisition 
responsibilities for USSOCOM equipment and manages SOACs manning/personnel 
strength requirements. 184 
4. Program Managers (PMs) 
Program Managers have full authority, responsibility and accountability for the 
execution of assigned USSOCOM acquisition programs within their approved APBs 
(Acquisition Program Baselines). As noted earlier, PMs are assigned based on the 
organization that is responsible for managing a particular acquisition program. When 
USSOCOM manages a program, the PM is assigned by the SOAE based on 
recommendations from the MDAE or PEOs. In-house PMs are provided functional 
support throughout the acquisition process by SOAC. When the Services are responsible, 
183 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
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Service MDAs assign the PM. These PMs report directly to the developing Service 
commander or PEO, or if designated, the SOAE or USSOCOM MDA or a USSOCOM 
PEO. Responsibilities ofUSSOCOM PMs and direct reporting PMs include but are not 
limited to: 
• Coordinating with J3 (Directorate of Operations), J 5/7 (Directorate of Plans, 
Policy and Strategic Assessments) and the Components to ensure that the 
operational requirements of their systems are being met. 
• Chartering Program-IPTs (P-IPTs) and requesting support from USSOCOM 
directorates and staff for all in-house programs. 
• Developing, coordinating and committing to an APB and reporting all 
potential and actual APB breaches to the USSOCOM PEO and MDA. 
• Developing and coordinating milestone documentation and conducting all 
other program related actions in preparation for SOABs, EPRs and Executive 
IPTs (E-IPTs). 
• Providing J8, through the SOAC, program documentation for USSOCOM 
POM and budget submittals.185 
5. System Acquisition Managers (SAMs) 
SAMs are USSOCOM unique individuals responsible to the USSOCOM PEO for 
managing and reporting on programs that have a designated Service PM. Specific 
responsibilities include but are not limited to: 
• Assisting Service PMs with program documentation to ensure it is coordinated 
with appropriate USSOCOM offices. 
• Validating the accuracy and consistency of Service PM documentation 
submitted for Milestone Decisions as well as POM and budget inputs. 
• Developing and coordinating PSMOAs (Program Specific Memorandums of 
Agreement) for their acquisition program. 
184Jbid., p. 7. 
185 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
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• Participating as a member of the Requirements IPT (R-IPT) and then 
assuming leadership of the P-IPT after the program formally transitions from 
JS/7 to the SOAE. In this capacity, SAMs lead pre-milestone 0 and Phase 0 
activities. 
• Identifying budget shortfalls or excesses to the PEO, initiating realignment or 
below threshold reprogramming of funds with PEOs and preparing supporting 
documentation for submission to J8 (Comptroller). 
• Maintaining awareness of Service or agency initiatives related to their 
assigned programs.186 
6. Program Requirements Officer (PRO) 
A PRO is assigned by J7 Requirements (J7-R) upon receipt of a requirements 
document (MNS/ORD) and is responsible for leading the working level R-IPT until the 
requirement is sufficiently defmed, recommended by the RRB and approved by 
USCINCSOC. The PRO retains the lead of the R-IPT until the requirement is handed off 
to the SOAE.187 
7. Assessment Directors (ADs) 
The five ADs (Strike, Engagement, Mobility, C4I and Support) are responsible 
for providing objective assessments of SOF mission area capabilities to USCINCSOC. 
Their mission is to " ... note imbalances and recommend solutions that improve capability 
(mission effectiveness) and optimize resource expenditures while maximizing 
interoperability for joint and combined operations."188 As advisors to the R-IPT, they 
provide a program's priority in the CBPL and its potential for inclusion in the 
RCCBPL.189 
186 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
187 Ibid., p. 24. 
188 USSOCOM Acquisition Management Training Course, p. 52. 
189 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, p. 24. 
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8. Component Commands 
The primary users of the systems procured by USSOCOM, Component 
commands identify capabilities and deficiencies regarding a specific threat and are key 
players in the Requirements Generation Process managed by the Directorate of Plans, 
Policy and Strategic Assessments (JS/7). In conjunction with the Services and the SOAE, 
Component commanders identify, review, validate and submit SO-peculiar MNSs and/or 
ORDs for USSOCOM approval. They also provide user inputs to the test planning 
process and are involved in the acquisition decision making process through their 
membership on IPTs and the SOAB. 190 
9. USSOCOM Directorates 
a) Directorate of Personnel (Jl) 
Responsibilities of the J1 include assisting the JS/7 in planning personnel 
requirements for new systems and for providing staff membership to support both 
Requirement and Program IPTs.191 
b) Directorate of Intelligence (J2) 
The J2 provides intelligence, counterintelligence and security support for 
new systems, provides representatives for Requirements and Program IPTs and manages 
all General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) initiatives for USSOCOM. The J2 also 
develops user requirements in conjunction with J5/7 for intelligence acquisition 
programs.192 
c) Directorate of Operations (J3) 
The J3 provides staff membership for both Requirements and Program 
IPTs and appoints the USSOCOM Chief, Operational Test and Evaluation (OT &E) who 
establishes OT &E procedures and supports the acquisition process by overseeing all SOF 
OT&E. Other responsibilities of the OT&E include but are not limited to: 
190 Ibid., p. 12. 
191 Ibid. 
192 1bid., pp. 12-13. 
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• Integrating training requirements for new equipment. 
• Preparing independent OT&E assessments for USCINCSOC and the MDA at 
milestone reviews. 
• For USSOCOM-managed programs and Service-managed programs where 
USSOCOM retains MDA, providing a recommendation in conjunction with 
J4 for materiel release to the MDA prior to the delivery of the first production 
item.193 
d) Directorate of Logistics (J4) 
In addition to providing membership for Requirements and Program IPTs, 
the Directorate of Logistics (J4) is responsible for establishing logistics policy for 
USSOCOM acquisition programs. Specific responsibilities include: 
• Participating in the development of requests for proposals (RFPs ), 
Statements of Work (SOW) and contract data requirements lists (CDRLs) for 
USSOCOM acquisition programs. 
• Co-chairing the acquisition to sustainment transition conferences for 
USSOCOM acquisition programs. 
• Participating in Acquisition Logistics Review Groups (LRGs) and Integrated 
Logistics Support Management Teams (ILSMTs). 
• Managing the Special Operations Forces Support Activity (SOFSA) logistics 
support activities. 194 
e) Directorate of Plans, Policy and Strategic Assessments (J5/7) 
The J5/7 directs USSOCOM's SPP and the RGS as described m 
USSOCOM Directive 70-2. In this capacity, the J5/7 provides the continuity needed to 
ensure the equipment being acquired satisfies both current and future SOF requirements. 
Specific responsibilities in the USSOCOM acquisition process include: 
193 1bid., pp. 13-14. 
194 1bid., pp. 14-15. 
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• Appointing a PRO from each functional area (weapons, support/survive, 
mobility and communications) that is responsible for monitoring all 
acquisition programs from a users perspective. 
• Identifying and planning for the effect that USSOCOM acquisition programs 
will have on USSOCOM's manpower and force structure. 
• Coordinating with PEOs and the Directorate of Procurement (SOKO) 
during PMAC studies. 
• Producing USSOCOM's CBPL and RCCBPL. 
• Approving up to $5 million of program funding adjustments that do not meet 
the criteria for SOAE unilateral approval. 
• Providing ADs to serve as IPT advisors.195 
j) Directorate of Command, Control, Communications, Computers 
and Information Systems (J6) 
The J6 is USSOCOM's proponent for C41 systems. Their responsibilities 
in the acquisition process include: 
• Developing user requirements, in conjunction with JS/7 for C41 systems. 
• Providing advice to the SOAE on communications technology. 
• Providing representatives for Requirements and Program IPTs.196 
g) Directorate of Resources (J8) 
The J8 is the staff proponent for programming, budgeting and executing 
USSOCOM's MFP 11 accounts. This directorate develops USSOCOM's POM and 
Budget Estimate Submissions (BES) and then presents and defends those documents 
following submission to OSD. The J8 provides membership to the Requirements and 
Program IPTs and also has the following responsibilities in USSOCOM's acquisition 
process: 
• Establishing both POM and budget policy, guidance and preparation 
instructions. 
195 1bid., pp. 15-16, 26. 
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• Managing the distribution and reprogramming of USSOCOM's 
appropriations. 
• Performing Sufficiency Reviews of program cost estimates prior to Milestone 
0 and at each subsequent milestone and for preparing and presenting 
affordability assessments at those milestone reviews. 
• Providing matrixed personnel from the J8 Investment Budget Branch (J8-
CI) to support the PEOs and Advanced Concepts Technology Division.197 
h) Other Participants 
Other organizations that are involved in the acquisition process at 
USSOCOM include the Staff Judge Advocate, who serves in an advisory role to many of 
the key players involved in the process, the Command Surgeon (SOSG) for SO-peculiar 
medical equipment and supplies and the Office of Legislative Affairs (SOLA) who serves 
as the prime interface between Congress and the SOAE for acquisition matters. 198 
D. ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT PROCESS 
1. Introduction 
Within DoD and USSOCOM, fielding a new weapon system requires the 
interaction of three major decision systems: (1) Requirements Generation System (RGS); 
(2) Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and (3) Acquisition 
Management System. Figure 5.4 reflects that interaction. Up to now, this chapter has 
discussed requirements generation activities and the PPBS, described the roles and 
responsibilities of the individuals and organizations involved in USSOCOM acquisition 
and described many unique features of the USSOCOM acquisition process, including 
PMAC studies, the BOD and SAMs. This section will describe the different phases and 
milestones of the acquisition process at USSOCOM which are in compliance with the 
DoD 5000 series of regulations. 
196 1bid., p. 16. 
197 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 
198 1bid., p. 17. 
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Figure 5.5: Acquisition Milestones and Phases (Class notes fm MN 4301, NPS Monterey) 
2. Acquisition Milestones and Phases 
USSOCOM uses the three-phase process described in the DoD 5000.2R for SO-
peculiar equipment acquisitions (see Figure 5.5). The acquisition process begins when the 
MNS or ORD formally transitions from the J5/7 to the SOAE, who assigns the 
appropriate PEO to develop recommendations for the conduct of phase 0 activities and to 
develop the Milestone 0 package. The SOAE is the MDA for all Milestone 0 decisions.199 
a) Pre-Milestone 0 Activities 
This is the period following receipt of the MNS/ORD from J5/7 prior to 
the Milestone 0 decision. After the SOAE selects a PEO for the materiel requirement, that 
PEO assigns a SAM who is responsible for preparing the program for Milestone 0. Tasks 
which SAMs are required to accomplish during this period include identifying the 
funding which will be required for the program, developing concept alternatives with the 
user and command resource sponsors and developing program documentation including 
the draft Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) for Milestone 0.200 This process up 
through Phase 1 is shown in Figure 5.6. 
b) Phase 0 (Concept Exploration and Definition) Activities 
Following the SOAE's Milestone 0 decision, the last of the three major 
decision systems in the acquisition process, the acquisition management process, 
begins. A PMAC study is conducted as early as possible during this phase to determine if 
the program should be USSOCOM-managed or delegated to a Service or agency. If 
Service management is approved, the PSMOA will begin to be developed and the Service 
or agency is included as a member of the P-IPT throughout the remainder of Phase 0. The 
PRO coordinates with the SAM and functional specialists from USSOCOM to define the 
materiel alternatives capable of satisfying the mission need.201 The materiel alternatives, 
in order of preference, are as follows: 
• Use or modification of an existing U.S. military system. 
199 Ibid., p. 26. 
200 USSOCOM Acquisition Management Training Course, p. 112. 
201 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, p. 26. 
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Figure 5.6: Program Initiation Matrix (USSOCOM Acqn Mgmt Training Course, P- 110) 
• Use or modification of existing commercially developed or allied 
system (NDI approach). 
• Cooperative R&D program with one or more allied nations. 
• New Joint-Service program. 
• New Service-unique development program.202 
Additionally, an acquisition strategy which defines the interrelationship between 
management, technical, resource, force structure, logistics, testing and business aspects of 
the program is developed. With the acquisition strategy and selected alternative defined, 
the next step in Phase 0 is the establishment of the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). 
For USSOCOM-managed programs, the APB and changes are approved by the 
USSOCOM MDA. For Service-managed programs, APBs and changes are jointly 
approved by the Service MDA and the SOAE or USSOCOM PE0.203 
The Milestone I ADM for exiting Phase 0, when approved by the MDA, formally 
establishes the program and documents the ACAT whether it will be USSOCOM or 
Service-managed. It also approves the proposed acquisition strategy and APB, identifies 
affordability constraints associated with the program and establishes quantitative exit 
criteria for Phase I (Program Definition and Risk Reduction).204 
c) Phase I (Program Definition and Risk Reduction) 
The objectives of Phase I, formerly referred to as Demonstration and 
Validation (DEM/V AL), are to improve the definition of the systems critical design 
characteristics, develop the information necessary to support a Milestone II decision and 
to refine program cost, schedule and performance objectives established in the APB. 
Accomplishments which are expected during this phase include identifying major cost, 
schedule and performance trade-offs (refers to the cost as an independent variable (CAIV) 
approach), refining the acquisition strategy (if necessary) to identify issues such as risk 
management approaches and Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) quantities, updating 
202 USSOCOM Acquisition Management Training Course, p. 115. 
203 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, pp. 27-28. 
204 USSOCOM Acquisition Management Training Course, p. 125. 
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life-cycle cost (LCC) assessments, programming adequate resources (people and funds) 
to support the program and proposing the exit criteria for Phase II (Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development). 205 
The Milestone II ADM approves the acquisition strategy, CAIV 
objectives, APB, LRIP quantities and exit criteria for Phase II.206 
d) Phase II (Engineering and Manufacturing Development) 
The objectives of this phase are to translate the most promising design 
approach into a producible, supportable and cost-effective system, validating the 
manufacturing and production processes during LRIP and demonstrating the system's 
capabilities through operational testing. During this phase the program office will once 
again determine a refined acquisition strategy and system cost estimate, update LCC 
assessments and annual funding requirements and program the necessary resources for 
production, deployment and support requirements. 207 
The Milestone III ADM will determine if the system is ready for 
production based on a variety of criteria including design maturity, test results, 
production capability and funding availability. 208 
e) Phase III (Production and Deployment/Operations and Support) 
During this phase the goal of the program office is to establish a stable, 
efficient production and support base and achieve an operational capability that satisfies 
the mission need. During the operation and support portion of this phase, follow-on 
operational and production testing is accomplished to confirm and monitor the quality 
and performance of the system and to assess the potential need for modifications.209 
205 DoD Regulation 5000.2R, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) and Major Automated 




209 1bid., p. 5. 
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E. EXAMPLES OF USSOCOM ACQUISITION PROGRAMS 
Prior to providing an analysis of USSOCOM's acquisition process in the next 
chapter, I will describe three examples of USSOCOM programs which conform with 
acquisition reform initiatives: Directional Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) missile 
defense system; Mark V Special Operations Craft (MK V SOC); Naval Special Warfare 
Rigid Inflatable Boat (NSW RIB); and Flight Data Recorders for USASOC MH47E and 
H60K aircraft. I will also briefly discuss the USSOCOM variant of the V -22 Osprey 
aircraft, referred to as the CV -22, and focus on one of the challenges USSOCOM 
encountered with this Service-managed program. 
1. Directional Infrared Countermeasure (DIRCM) 
DIRCM is a missile defense system deployed on USSOCOM's AC/MC-130 
aircraft fleet which enhances the survival capability of the aircraft against currently 
deployed infrared missiles. The system also possesses growth capability to handle future 
generations of anti-aircraft missiles. The program is managed in cooperation with the 
United Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UK MoD), which owns the DIRCM $300 million 
missile defense contract. USSOCOM leverages a $175 million portion of the contract to 
develop, produce, install, field and sustain 59 DIRCM systems on its aircraft. 
USSOCOM is also responsible for managing program-wide developmental testing, 
necessitating the establishment of Program Management Offices (PMOs) in both the 
·United States and the United Kingdom.210 
As a way to integrate and control its extended acquisition organization, the 
DIRCM PMO at USSOCOM established two Integrated Product Teams. The first, the 
Group A Aircraft Integration IPT, was established in August/September 1995 and focuses 
on facilitating contractor aircraft integration performance. Its members include 
representatives from key stakeholder organizations: Secretary of the Air Force 
Acquisition Command; Air Force Materiel Command Aeronautical Systems Center and 
Air Logistics Center; developmental and operational test organizations; the using 
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command (AFSOC); and the contractors, Northrup Grumman and Chrysler. The second, 
the U.S. Program Office IPT, was established in November/December 1995 after 
assessing the success of the first IPT. The purpose of this IPT is to manage the U.S. 
DIRCM acquisition phases (as discussed in the previous section) by controlling program 
cost, schedule, system performance, quality, risk and sustainment factors. This IPT 
includes one representative from each of the functional elements, an advisor from 
selected stakeholder organizations and a representative from the U.K.211 
The success of the DIRCM program is reflected in their receipt of the David 
Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award, which recognizes the best DoD acquisition 
IPTs from the Army, Navy, Air Force, USSOCOM, Defense Logistics Agency and the 
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Specifically, the DIRCM program was 
recognized for meeting critical and time-sensitive acquisition objectives for a cooperative 
acquisition effort with the United Kingdom. The award also cited cost savings resulting 
from the cooperative agreement, innovative test procedures and streamlining of IPT 
management.212 
2. Mark V Special Operations Craft (MK V SOC) 
The MK V SOC is used by Navy SEALS (Sea, Air, Land) and Special Boat Units 
for missions such as medium-range insertion/extraction and limited coastal patrol and 
interdiction. It is a high performance combatant craft with a range in excess of 600 
nautical miles and top speeds that exceed 50 knots. The MK V is configured to deploy 
on a U.S. Air Force C-5 Galaxy transport aircraft, and together with its trailer, prime 
mover and support equipment can be delivered to any location in the world in less than 
48 hours. In addition, the MK V can be brought from air transport to combat ready 
configuration in 24 hours. 213 
210 Alan Childress, CW04, USA, USSOCOM, "U.S. Special Operations Command-A "Customer-Led" IPT 
Success Story," Program Manager, (May-June 1996), p 10. 
211 Ibid., pp. 11-14. 
212 
"David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Awards Named," Federal Department and Agency 
Documents, (May 3, 1996), Ref. No. 258-96, p. 2. 




The MK Vis a streamlined USSOCOM-managed acquisition program that used 
non-traditional acquisition processes and off-the-shelf technology to move from concept 
to operation in just three years. The first two MK V SOC, priced at approximately $4 
million apiece, were delivered to NA VSPECW ARCOM only 18 months after the 
contract was awarded to Halter Marine Industries of New Orleans, Louisiana. 
NA VSPECW ARCOM will eventually receive a total of 20 MK V s.214 When the program 
originated in 1992, the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) was chosen to manage 
it. Not long after this decision was made, NA VSEA informed USSOCOM that delivery 
of the first operational unit would take approximately seven years. This was unacceptable 
to USSOCOM, leading to the removal ofNA VSEA from the program and the creation of 
the MK V SOC Program Office at USSOCOM, the first major acquisition program 
undertaken by the SOAC.215 The substantial difference in concept to operation time 
frames (four years) is testimony that incorporating acquisition reform initiatives into the 
acquisition process does enable the acquisition community to deliver quality equipment 
to the warflghter without excessive lead times. 
3. Naval Special Warfare Rigid Inflatable Boat (NSW RIB) 
The NSW RIB is a 36' C-130 aircraft transportable vessel that is capable of 
maintaining a 27-knot cruising speed while carrying a variable payload of 3,200 pounds, 
which includes a squad of eight SEALs and two Combat Rubber Raiding Craft (CRRC) 
with outboard motors. They will replace a variety of 24'-33' RIBs that have in use by 
Special Boat Units since 1987 that have been singularly unable to achieve 
NA VSPECW ARCOM requirements.216 
Only 16 months after the NSW PMO stood up at USSOCOM, three test article 
(prototype) RIBs from Intermarine in Savannah, Georgia, United States Marine in Slidell, 
Louisiana and Willard Marine in Anaheim, California were delivered to USSOCOM to 
214Jbid. 
215 Phone interview between Mr. Dale Freeman, Booz, Allen, Hamilton representative, MK V Program 
Office, USSOCOM, Tampa, Florida and author, 12 December 1996. 
216 Chris Paddock, CDR, SC, USN, USSOCOM, "The Newest SOCOM Boat Program is Alive and Well on 
MacDill," SOAC Newsletter, (December 1996), Vol. 1, No.1, pp. 5-6. 
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begin Developmental and Operational Testing (DT/OT). This DT/OT period will extend 
over a five-month period and involve personnel from two Special Boat Units, two SEAL 
teams, Air Force personnel, Government laboratory representatives and contractor 
support personnel. After DT/OT finishes in April 1997 and approval from the MDA (in 
this case the SOAE) for Milestone III A is received, a Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 
contract option for four RIBs will be awarded to the winner. A Test Article (prototype) 
Refurbishment contract option will be concurrently awarded to the winner to refurbish its 
test article to "production representative" condition for independent testing by the Navy 
Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR). After a successful OPTEVFOR 
evaluation and a favorable Milestone III B decision (two Milestone III decisions 
represent a tailored approach to the acquisition process used by USSOCOM) by the 
SOAE, a Full Rate Production contract option for 16 RIBs, scheduled for delivery in FY 
1998, will be exercised. A total of 70 RIBs are required by NA VSPECW ARCOM to 
meet Full Operational Capability.217 
A sample of some of the acquisition reform initiatives implemented for the NSW 
RIB include: 
• Using a tailored ORD to permit the use of a modified non-developmental 
item (NDI). This was accomplished through a steady dialogue between 
NA VSPECW ARCOM and the RIB Program Office. 
• Issuing one solicitation for the entire acquisition which included the basic 
contract for test article construction, a Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) option for 
test article refurbishment and Firm Fixed Price (FFP) options for the entire 
LRIP and Full Rate production periods. 
• Employing an Executive IPT concept, consisting of "empowered" 
representatives of SOAB members (listed earlier in the chapter). This paved 
the way for a "paper" Milestone II decision, meaning that the MDA approved 
entering into Phase II without convening a SOAB. 
217 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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• Conducting a two-step evaluation process which incorporated a preliminary 
evaluation to eliminate offerors who did not stand a reasonable chance of 
award, thus saving time and money for both USSOCOM and industry. 
• Referencing only three MILSPECs and MILSTDs for guidance. 
• Combining DT lOT into one phase. 
• Issuing an indefinite pricing schedule which permits effortless quantity 
adjustments (between one and twenty-four) in response to budget 
increases/decreases as determined by Congress. 
• Issuing the solicitation, amendments and question responses on the electronic 
bulletin board (the first at USSOCOM to use).218 
4. Flight Data Recorders for the MH47E and H60K Aircraft 
A superb example of how quickly an urgent USSOCOM requirement can be 
satisfied is the delivery of flight data recorders to USASOC for their MH47E and H60K 
aircraft. In March 1996, a USASOC MH47E aircraft crashed. Because the aircraft cockpit 
gauges were digital, they were of little value to the crash investigators who were unable 
to determine the cause of the crash. Since all of USASOC's MH47E and H60K aircraft 
were equipped with the same digital cockpit displays, USASOC submitted a Combat 
MNS citing the need to have flight data recorders installed on all of these aircraft. This 
type of recorder would have contained the information investigators needed to determine 
the cause of this crash and which could have been used to prevent similar incidents 
from occurring. 
Within 19 days of the accident, a Combat MNS for a NDI Flight Data Recorder 
had been submitted by USASOC and approved by USCINCSOC, funding had been 
arranged and the program authorization had been signed. The contract was written at 
USSOCOM and as of November 1996, flight data recorders for all of USASOC's 
MH47E and H60K aircraft had been delivered.219 
218 Ibid., pp. 2-3. 




5. CV -22 Osprey 
The CV -22, a tiltrotor aircraft, is the SOF variant of the USMC MV -22 Osprey 
which is designed to perform long-range infiltration, exfiltration and resupply missions 
for SOF personnel. Development of the aircraft, which is designed and produced as a 
joint effort by the team of Bell Helicopter Textron of Forth Worth, Texas and Boeing 
Helicopter, Philadelphia, is directed by the Naval Air Systems Command's PMA-275, the 
joint program office which manages the program on behalf of the Marines, the Navy and 
USSOCOM. A total of 50 aircraft are scheduled to be procured by USSOCOM between 
2003 and 2010.220 
In March 1996, USCINCSOC threatened to wrestle control of the CV portion of 
the V-22 program away from PMA-275 because he felt that under the Navy's plan 
USSOCOMs aircraft would not be delivered on time or in a mission capable 
configuration. This threat was prompted by a set of "unacceptable" options presented to 
USSOCOM which would "delay CV-22 major design activity until FY 1997, cap the 
program at $550 million in RDT&E for FY 1996 and move critical sub-systems to later 
product improvements." NA V AIR was accused by USCINCSOC of using a 
"disproportionate percentage" of CV -22 funds in FY 1996 and FY 1997 to offset inflation 
adjustments and to pay other program bills. 221 
At issue was the difference between the $550 million the Air Force Special 
Operations Command estimated would be required for CV RDT&E and the $750 million 
estimated by the Bell-Boeing team. The contractors bid was based on requirements 
defined and expanded after the 1994 Defense Acquisition Board (DoD equivalent of 
USSOCOM's SOAB) and not finalized until April 1995. A Department of the Navy 
official placed blame on the Air Force Special Operations Command, stating that they 
expected "unconstrained requirements growth that they don't have to pay for." The issue 
became even more complicated because Loral, a company which has accomplished 
220 
"Special Operations Command Threatens Hostile Takeover ofCV-22," Tactical Technology, (March 20, 
1996), Vol. 6, No. 6., p. 1. 
221 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
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integration work on other special operations aircraft, suggested through service and 
industry sources that it could accomplish the job for less than $400 million.222 
The issue was eventually resolved and PMA-275 retained control of 
USSOCOM's portion of the V-22 funding. The program has entered the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase and the price for the CV -22 RDT &E, 
including the contract and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), totaled $560 
million. 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has defined the terms and concepts that are unique to USSOCOM's 
acquisition process, described the roles and responsibilities of the components, 
directorates and key personnel in that process and described the core activities that must 
be accomplished in the milestones and phases of an acquisition program. 
The final section was written to shift from merely summarizing USSOCOM and 
DoD directives and reform initiatives of the past decade to writing about actual 
USSOCOM programs that are attempting to incorporate those initiatives. It provides the 
reader with examples of USSOCOM and Service-managed programs, and in the case of 
the CV-22 Osprey, reflects the challenges with which USSOCOM must cope with when 
a Service program office is not providing an acceptable level of program support. 
The final chapter will provide an analysis of USSOCOM's acquisition process 
and determine if it follows the intent of acquisition reform initiatives of the past decade. 
This analysis will be based on answers to the primary and subsidiary thesis research 
questions presented in Chapter I and will incorporate results of interviews conducted with 
personnel associated with the USSOCOM acquisition process. The fmal chapter will also 
provide recommendations to improve those areas of the USSOCOM acquisition process 
that have been determined to be in non-compliance with reform initiatives. 
222 Ibid., p. 2. 
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VI. ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter will utilize the information provided in Chapters II through V 
not only to facilitate answering the primary and secondary research questions, but also to 
serve as the primary source for developing my recommendations and follow-on thesis 
topics concerning the acquisition process at USSOCOM. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTONS 
1. Secondary Research Questions 
a) What are the findings, recommendations and requirements of the 
acquisition reform initiatives of the past decade, including the Packard Commission, 
Defense Management Review (DMR), Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DA WIA), National Performance Review, Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (F ASA), 
OSD Acquisition Process Action Team Report, Federal Acquisition Reform Act (F ARA) 
and Best Value Contracting? 
Chapter III was dedicated to answenng this question therefore this 
discussion will focus on specific reform initiatives which have been incorporated into 
USSOCOM's acquisition process. 
The programs described at the end of Chapter V each reflect the 
emphasis that is being placed on streamlining the acquisition process at USSOCOM. 
Although the discussion on the NSW RIB Program contained the largest number of 
specific initiatives, the success of the other programs (DIRCM, MK V SOC and Flight 
Data Recorders for USASOC aircraft) can be attributed to the incorporation of 
acquisition initiatives introduced in Chapter III of this thesis. The DIRCM Program 
Office, for example, was not only highly successful in implementing IPTs, but was also 
able to satisfy the requirement by coordinating with the United Kingdom's Ministry of 
Defense. As noted in Chapter V, coordinating with an allied nation to satisfy 
requirements is preferred over developing a joint or Service-unique program, and is 
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consistent with the emphasis on utilizing NDI, COTS and GOTS equipment whenever 
possible. The rapid delivery and success of the MK V SOC can also be attributed to the 
streamlined acquisition processes utilized for the program, including the use of off-the-
shelf technology and performance specifications. Finally, the rapid delivery of the flight 
data recorders to USASOC reflects USSOCOM' s ability to streamline and tailor the 
acquisition process to satisfy the needs of the user. Once again, the use of non-
developmental equipment paved the way for this requirement. More importantly though 
is the fact that a streamlined plan had already been developed to handle urgent 
requirements such as this. In addition, LTC Sobey, the SAM for the MH47E and H60K 
aircraft, noted that the matrixed Budget Analyst from J8-CI played an important role in 
coordinating the funding for this program. This requirement alone reflects the 
importance and value of the matrixed support from J8-CI. 
An excellent indication of USSOCOM's commitment to incorporate 
reform initiatives into the acquisition process is the recent creation of an acquisition 
reform database within SOAC's Procurement Directorate (SOKO-K). In the report, 
SOKO-K tracks the major contracts written in-house and annotates whether they comply 
with the reform areas which they have chosen to monitor. During an interview with Mr. 
Ralph Roe, the Chief of the Policy Branch within SOKO (SOKO-M), he stated that the 
database was developed using recent major reform initiatives, including F ASA and 
PARA, and is intended to provide SOAC's leadership with a snapshot in time of how 
SOKO is applying reform initiatives to major contracts. Since the acquisition 
environment is constantly changing, the database is not set in stone. Rather, it was 
established on the premise that additional changes in acquisition laws and regulations will 
occur, and to be a useful tool now and in the future, the database must be adaptive.223 
Some of the reform areas and the specific initiatives being monitored within those areas 
include: 
• Streamlined acquisition of commercial items. 
223 Phone interview between Mr. Ralph Roe, SOKO-M, USSOCOM, Tampa, Florida and author, 4 
December 1996. 
108 
=> Use of market research. 
=> Use of contractor's customary commercial practices. 
=> Use of simplified procedures for procurements of commercial items 
with a value less than $5 million. 
=> Agency needs were stated in terms of functions to be performed, 
performance required and essential interfaces. 
• Debriefmg and other contract changes. 
=> New open and frank debriefing process used for unsuccessful offerors. 
=> Significantly limited number of proposals in the competitive range. 
=> Awarded without discussions to save administrative costs. 
=> Included past performance and quality as mandatory evaluation 
factors. 
• Past performance data-evaluation and reporting. 
=> Past performance data acquired from both Government and non-
Government sources. 
=> Past performance evaluations being performed in accordance with 
FAR requirements. 
=> Past performance evaluated as a significant factor on competitively 
negotiated contracts in accordance with FAR requirements. 
• Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) and related changes 
=> Contracting Officer used one of the five exceptions to cost or pricing 
data. 
=> Head of Contracting Authority (HCA) waiver of cost or pricing data 
was obtained. 
• Other streamlining areas being tracked. 
=> Use ofiPTs. 
=> Use of Draft RFPs/SPEC to draw comments from industry. 
=> Use of contractor conferences. 
=> Streamlining of Milestone documentation. 
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=> Use ofNDI, COTS and GOTS equipment. 
=> Use of oral presentations. 
Another example of USSOCOM's acquisition streamlining effort is the 
recent creation of a SOAC web page (http:/1157.202.202.2/). The web page describes 
SOAC, is linked to Federal acquisition bulletin boards and the Acquisition Reform 
Network, and most importantly, lists procurement opportunities that exist at USSOCOM. 
The page is currently under construction but it does contain the solicitations for the 
Special Operations Forces Support Activity (SOFSA) and Systems Engineering and 
Technical Assistance (SETA) contracts. These contracts are briefly described later in the 
chapter. 
USSOCOM's compliance with Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DA WIA) requirements is also noteworthy. Of the 118 acquisition 
positions, 110 (93 percent) are either Level II or III certified. This high qualification rate 
can be attributed to an effective training program within SOAC. In addition, the close 
proximity of USSOCOM' s Acquisition Executive expedites the certification of 
USSOCOM's personnel.224 
Two additional examples of acquisition streamlining efforts within 
USSOCOM are the use of Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) strategies and Technology 
Development Programs. 
An EA strategy, by definition, is utilized " ... when it is anticipated that 
achieving the desired overall capability will require the system to evolve during 
development, manufacture or deployment."225 Based on the same concept as pre-planned 
product improvement, "this strategy should be considered for systems where 
requirements refinements are anticipated or where a technology risk or opportunity 
discourages immediate implementation of a required capability."226 This type of strategy 
accommodates three of the major themes in the updated DoD 5000 series of regulations. 
224 Ms. Christa Ward phone interview. 
225 USSOCOM Acquisition Management Training Course, p. 143. 
226 USSOCOM Directive 70-1, p. 23. 
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First, regardless whether an IPT is formed, the success of this strategy hinges on the 
ability of the users, developers, logisticians and testers to work together as a team. 
Second, adopting an EA strategy reflects a commitment to tailor the acquisition process 
rather than using the traditional Milestones and Phases described in Chapter V. And 
finally, an EA strategy is designed to take advantage of the latest technological advances 
available in the commercial market. 
Technology Development Programs, managed by the Military Deputy to 
the Acquisition Executive (MDAE), include advanced technology developments which 
demonstrate the technological, performance and cost advantages of COTS technology. 
These programs are unique in that a SOF Technology Base Project Development 
Definition Document, rather than a MNS or ORD, is the basis to initiate a SOF 
technology.227 Current technology programs within USSOCOM include the Tactical 
Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) program, the Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal/Low Intensity Conflict (EODILIC) program and the Medical Technology 
Development Program. 228 
b) What were the principal recommendations of the USSOCOM A-
PAT Report? 
Chapter IV contains the response to this question. Additionally, the 
recommendations are summarized in the ensuing question. 
c) Are the recommendations of the USSOCOM A-PAT Report 
being implemented effectively? 
Developing an answer to this question involved contacting USSOCOM 
acquisition personnel and asking them to provide their opinions on the status and success 
of the implementation process. Since there are multiple A-PAT recommendations, a 
simple yes or no response to this question would not suffice, therefore, the 
implementation status of each recommendation is discussed below. 
227 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
228 USSOCOM Acquisition Management Training Course, p. 119. 
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(1) Requirements Interface Implementation Plan 
(a) Implementation of USSOCOM IPTs 
Based on the A-PAT recommendation, the EQB decided 
that IPTs would be formed by 17-R upon receipt of a requirements document. In practice, 
this decision was difficult to implement because the personnel requirements to establish 
R-IPTs for every requirements document could not be met. As a result, R-IPTs are 
formed when the complexity and magnitude of the requirements document warrant doing 
so. This procedural change was spearheaded by the 17-R and will be reflected in the 
updated version of USSOCOM Directive 70-1 (USSOCOM Acquisition Management 
Procedures). 229 
The final section of Chapter V highlighted three highly 
successful USSOCOM managed programs (DIRCM, MK V SOC and NSW RIB) that 
have benefited from the IPT philosophy. It is important to note that the DIRCM IPTs 
were created prior to the USSOCOM A-PAT recommendation. Those involved with the 
DIRCM program felt that the use of IPTs would be the best means of overcoming 
challenges and ensuring the success of their program. Additional USSOCOM-managed 
programs that are utilizing IPTs include the SOFSA contract, a $1.2 billion agreement 
which provides logistics support for SOF unique equipment, and the SETA contract, a 
$100 million contract that provides USSOCOM and Service program managers for SOF 
acquisitions support for all phases of the acquisition cycle from pre-milestone zero 
concept studies to post milestone three fielding. 
(b) Use of ORDs in Lieu of MNS 
The A-PAT recommendation accepted by the EQB was that 
USSOCOM would encourage components, and other requirements sponsors, to use an 
Operational Requirements Document (ORD) in lieu of a Mission Needs Statement 
(MNS) when the solution to a materiel deficiency is a non-developmental (NDI), 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or Government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) item. 
229 Phone interview between LTCOL Saier, USAF, USSOCOM, Tampa, Florida and author, 9 December 
1996. -
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To date, the components submitting requirements have not 
adopted this philosophy. This can be attributed to the recent nature of this 
recommendation and a culture within the requirements community throughout each of 
the components that is content with the current process (of drafting a MNS that is 
separate from the ORD). The updated USSOCOM Directive 70-1 will describe this 
policy and should increase the use of ORDs as the initial requirements document; 
however, the ultimate success of this recommendation is dependent on a cultural change 
in the component'~ requirements communities.230 
(c) Cost Analysis of New Requirements 
The A-PAT recommendation to accomplish cost 
verifications of requirements documents is being accomplished as directed by the EQB. 
Mr. Alan Bussey, one of three Cost Analysts assigned to J8-CC, stated that the J8-CC 
representative on the R-IPT is tasked with accomplishing the sufficiency review for that 
requirement. Sufficiency reviews are also completed prior to milestone decisions. When 
R-IPTs are not formed (as discussed previously), the J8-CC still conducts sufficiency 
reviews but the requirement is channeled to them differently.231 
(d) Requirements (JS) to Acquisition (AE) 
Transition Process 
The success of this implementation was best summed up by 
LTC Bob Sobey, USA, the SAM for the MH-47E and MH-60K, when he stated that 
SOAC " .. .is no longer receiving ORDs that are not funded."232 As a result, PEOs, PMs 
and SAMs are able to devote their efforts and resources on funded programs rather than 
focusing on programs that may or may not ultimately receive funding. 
230 Ibid. 
231 Phone interview between Mr. Alan Bussey, J8-CC, USSOCOM, Tampa, Florida and author, 9 
December 1996. 
232 LTC So bey phone interview. 
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(2) J8/SOAC Interface Implementation Plan 
(a) JB-CI Matrixed Budget Support to PEOs 
Each individual contacted within SOAC stated that the 
relationship between J8 and SOAC has improved since the USSOCOM A-PAT, but that 
there is still room for improvement. According to MAJ Mark McNabb, Senior Financial 
Analyst in the SOAC Investment Division (SOAC/SD-1), "the A-PAT forced people to 
look at things differently (i.e., the J8/SOAC interface) and has made working together 
easier ... Now that we are committed, finding the most efficient way of using the 
manpower is the challenging part. "233 
The implementation plan called for the assignment of four 
Budget Analysts (BA) from J8-CI to each of the four PEOs, with the matrixed BA for the 
Special Programs PEO splitting his/her time with the Advanced Concepts and 
Engineering Division. Various interviews revealed that the success of the matrixing 
concept hinged on the ability of the PEO' s and their financial staff to communicate their 
requirements to their matrixed BA and the Chief of the Budget Investment Branch (J8-
CI). An example of a successful matrixing effort exists within the PEO M&R 
organization. Their open lines of communication enabled them expedite the funding of 
two emergent programs (i.e., Battle Dress System (BDS) and Flight Data Recorders for 
the MH47-E and H-60K) that would have been extremely difficult to accomplish without 
the support of their matrixed BA. 234 
Just as important as maintaining open lines of 
communication is the existence of specific job requirements for the matrixed BA's. 
LTCOL O'Brien, the J8-CI, stated that a USSOCOM A-PAT after action report noted the 
need for a matrixed BA job description. This is currently being developed235 and once it 
233 Phone interview between MAJ Mark McNabb, USAF, USSOCOM, Tampa, Florida and author, 25 
November 1996. 
234 LTC Sobey phone interview. 
235 Phone interview between LTCOL Pat O'Brien, USAF, JS-CI, USSOCOM, Tampa, Florida and author, 9 
December 1996. 
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is finalized, should further improve the working relationship that exists between SOAC 
and J8. 
(b) Removal of SOAC/SD-1 from PAIMIPRIAF 
Form 9 Processing 
Following USSOCOM's A-PAT, SD-1 is no longer 
involved in PAIMIPR/AF Form 9 processing, therefore it is in compliance with the 
recommendation. Their involvement is no longer required because the PEOs Financial 
Analysts combined with the matrixed J8-CI support ensure that documents can be 
processed through J8-C with minimal review. 
Although the SD-1 division is no longer processmg 
PAIMIPR/AF Form 9, implementation of the Program Budgeting Accounting System 
(PBAS) (directed by the OSD Comptroller for all DoD agencies) following the A-PAT 
has kept SD-1 involved in the process of passing spending authority. In this capacity, 
SD-1 is not checking the accuracy of financial documentation. Rather, they are 
supporting the SOAE by acting as the source through which spending authority for 
RDT &E, Procurement and procurement related O&M funds is passed to the PEOs. Since 
PBAS was instituted following the A-PAT, its involvement in the PBAS process has no 
bearing on its compliance with the A-PAT recommendation. It is included in this section 
to document the current involvement of SD-1. 
(c) Team Approach on All Collateral Financial 
Responsibilities 
This recommendation involved implementing a teamwork 
approach on a variety of financial issues including POM and budget submissions, 
reprogramming actions, fund recissions and program execution analyses. 
This team approach is currently in place and its success can 
be measured by the improved level of communication that exists between all parties 
involved. The lack of trust between acquisition and Comptroller personnel has given way 
to an increased level of understanding that has expedited these processes. Although 
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adversarial relationships remain, the approach recommended by the A-PAT has had a 
positive impact. 
(3) Assessment Director/ AE Interface Implementation Plan 
(a) Funding Authority in Year-of-Execution and 
Budget Years 
The Executive Quality Board decided that PEOs would be 
empowered to realign/or reprogram funds among programs on the RCCBPL without prior 
coordination with the J5 (Directorate of Plans, Policy and Strategic Assessment) if the 
total increase to any program is less than $5 million in any execution or budget year if 
there is: less than a six month slip or acceleration in any of the effected programs, no 
change to the BOD-approved total inventory objective, no effect on manpower and the 
acquisition program baseline is not breached. 
This recommendation has been implemented, but the 
primary issue that requires attention concerns the authority that the USSOCOM PEOs 
should have. In accordance with Title 10, United States Code (1 0 USC), PEOs are 
authorized to annually realign or reprogram up to $3.99 million in RDT&E funds and 
$9.99 million in Procurement funds. By requiring J5/7 and AD approval for funding 
adjustments in excess of $5 million, the USSOCOM acquisition process places 
constraints on PEOs that should not exist according to 1 0 USC. In addition, this policy 
does not appear to provide PEOs the flexibility necessary to manage their programs and 
does not recognize the responsibility and authority inherent to a PEO. 
d) Are the findings and recommendations of the USSOCOM A-PAT 
similar with those found in the OSD A-PAT Report? If not, identify the primary 
differences. 
The findings and recommendations of the A-PATs are as different as the 
two charters which established them. Where the OSD A-PAT set out to " ... develop ... a 
comprehensive plan to reengineer the oversight and review process for systems 
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acquisitions ... ,"236 the USSOCOM A-PAT was chartered " ... to improve the HQ 
USSOCOM Acquisition Management Process."237 This focus on internal improvement 
reflects USSOCOM's belief that comprehensive changes similar to those recommended 
by the OSD A-PAT were not required. This basic difference in philosophy then provides 
the answer to this question. 
Despite the basic differences between the two A-PATs, it is worthwhile to 
focus attention on the objectives of the OSD A-PAT described in Chapter III and to ask 
if the USSOCOM A-PAT should have attempted to accomplish more. The first objective 
of the OSD A-PAT was to "help field what the warfighter needs when he needs it."238 
Comments received during recent interviews with Mr. Bill Chadwick, a commercial 
contractor that works with the JSOC J8-R and who previously served as Chief of 
USASOC's Systems Integration Division while on active duty, and Mr. 0. D. Knight, the 
current Chief of USASOC's System Integration Division, lead the researcher to believe 
the components feel this objective is not being met. During interviews, Mr. Chadwick 
and Mr. Knight each conveyed that USSOCOM's Requirements Generation process 
slows down the process of providing equipment to the warfighter. Specific comments 
such as " ... USSOCOM treats $200 thousand programs like $100 million dollar 
programs"239 and " ... USSOCOM exerts excess control over the Requirements 
Generation System ... By trying to make all programs joint, USSOCOM ends up creating 
larger requirements,"240 reflect their frustration with the process. Although the success of 
an acquisition program is mutually dependent on the Requirements Generation System 
(RGS), Acquisition Management System and Planning, Programming and Budgeting 
System (PPBS), modifying the RGS was not included in the USSOCOM A-PAT charter 
and therefore was not addressed. Nonetheless, the issue deserves further attention because 
236 Reengineering, Vol. 1, p. vi. 
237 USSOCOM A-PAT Final Report/Implementation Plan, App. A, p. 1. 
238 OSD A-PAT, Volume 1, p. 2. 
239 Phone interview between Mr. O.D. Knight, USASOC, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and author, 25 
November 1996. 
240 Phone interview between Mr. Bill Chadwick, JSOC, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and author, 25 
November 1996. 
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the perception of the JSOC and USASOC representatives is that USSOCOM's RGS is 
too rigid and should be more responsive to their requirements. Additionally, Mr. 
Chadwick noted that the Components are hindered by the requirement to provide price 
and quantity information with their MNS/ORD. Since the primary intent of these 
documents is to identify the requirement, in his opinion it is unnecessary to require the 
Components to provide this information upon submission of the MNS/ORD. 
Another objective of the OSD A-PAT was to "promote flexibility and 
encourage innovation based on mutual trust, risk management and program 
performance."241 The basic premise of this objective was that those closest to the 
information are competent and trustworthy enough to make reasonable decisions. Mr. 
Chadwick and Mr. Knight both stated that milestone decision authority (MDA) should be 
delegated to the Services more often. A similar opinion was voiced by a representative of 
AFSOC when they commented on the USSOCOM A-PAT: "let Service PMs manage 
programs--less micro management..."242 These comments pertain to this objective because 
those closest to the requirement (i.e., the Services) feel that they should have the 
opportunity to manage more of the programs. Because of time constraints, this issue was 
not fully addressed by the USSOCOM A-PAT. Despite the time constraints, the A-PAT 
did " ... strongly recommend increased scrutiny of Service-managed programs by 
proposing that the AE retain MDA over more Service-managed programs .... "243 This 
recommendation is contrary to the opinions of the components and requires additional 
review. One would question then why the Component's A-PAT representatives allowed 
the A-PAT to go to print with this recommendation. 
A third objective of the OSD A-PAT was to "demand accountability by 
matching managerial authority with responsibility. "244 One of the purposes of this 
objective was to ensure that individuals outside of a program's executing chain should 
not be authorized to either make or delay program decisions. This objective relates to the 
241 OSD A-PAT, Volume 1, p. 2. 
242 USSOCOM A-PAT Final Report/Implementation Plan, App. E., AFSOC comments. 
243 Ibid., p. 33. 
244 OSD A-PAT, Volume I, p. 2. 
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process addressed during the USSOCOM A-PAT and subsequently implemented, which 
requires USSOCOM PEOs to receive J5/7 and AD approval to reprogram and realign 
program funds. As discussed in the previous section, this requirement appears to be 
contrary to 10 USC and it is not consistent with the intent of this OSD A-PAT objective. 
In the researchers opinion, an individual who is capable of managing multiple programs 
should be entrusted to make reprogramming decisions that he/she is legally authorized to 
do and that are that are in the best interest ofUSSOCOM. 
In Chapter IV, eight of the OSD A-PAT's 33 recommendations were 
discussed because of their relevance to USSOCOM's acquisition process. Of the ones 
listed, the only recommendation which SOAC appears to be in non-compliance with is 
the recommendation that all acquisition programs, regardless of ACAT classification, be 
aligned in the PM-PEO-AE chain. Based on information gathered during interviews with 
USSOCOM personnel, SOAC currently reflects a PM-PEO-MDAE-AE alignment. By 
adding the MDAE to the reporting alignment, the clear, simplified PEO-AE chain of 
command envisioned by the OSD A-PAT is not currently in place. Although the author is 
unable to delineate the MDAE's specific role in this alignment, this issue merits 
discussion because of the frequency in which it was raised during interviews and because 
it is contrary to the OSD A-PAT's recommendation. 
e) If USSOCOM is not fully complying with the intent of acquisition 
reform, what changes should be made to the acquisition process to implement reform 
initiatives? 
The response to this question is found in the recommendations section of 
this chapter (Section C). 
2. Primary Research Question 
Do USSOCOM acquisition procedures comply with the intent of acquisition 
reform initiatives of the past decade? 
The objective of discussing the secondary research questions to open this chapter 
was to present the background information needed to support a response to this question. 
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The research shows there are numerous instances where USSOCOM is doing an 
outstanding job incorporating reform initiatives into their acquisition process. In fact, 
this organization appears to be at the forefront of acquisition reform streamlining. The 
examples cited in this thesis, including the overwhelming success of the MK V SOC and 
NSW RIB Programs, the implementation of many of USSOCOM's A-PAT 
recommendations, the improved working relationship between the J8-C and SOAC, the 
Procurement Directorate's development of an acquisition reform database and SOAC's 
responsiveness to the Combat MNS for flight data recorders, give credence to this claim. 
Many other examples of acquisition streamlining efforts within USSOCOM may have 
been overlooked, but the message should be clear that the USSOCOM acquisition process 
is constantly evolving and improving because of its ability to incorporate acquisition 
reform initiatives. 
Despite all of the positive examples ofUSSOCOM's compliance with acquisition 
reform initiatives, there are a few areas in its acquisition process that appear to be non-
compliant. These specific include of non-compliance include the Component's (JSOC 
and USASOC) perception that the RGS is too rigid and unresponsive, the required 
involvement of the ADs for the reprogramming and realignment of funds exceeding $5 
million and the reporting alignment (PM-PEO-MDAE-AE) which exists within the 
SOAC. In all likelihood, events that have transpired throughout the brief history of 
USSOCOM and SOAC form the basis for these policies and business practices, therefore 
it would be naive to state, based on the research conducted in the past few months, that 
they must be changed. It would be beneficial, however, if the parties involved establish 
a dialogue on these topics to determine if changes to the current acquisition process need 
to occur. 
The most significant factors contributing to USSOCOM's ability to integrate 
reform initiatives into their acquisition process are the relatively small size of the 
organization (compared to the Services) and the close proximity of the headquarters and 
SOAC. Having all of the key decision makers from the Requirements Generation System 
(RGS), Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and Acquisition 
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Management System located on MacDill AFB within a ten minute walk from each other 
creates a level of familiarity that does not exist within the Services. Because of these 
factors, USSOCOM has greater flexibility in managing their acquisition programs 
resulting in the use of innovative and progressive acquisition techniques. 
Another reason USSOCOM has successfully implemented reform initiatives is 
that it has recognized that a streamlined process must be used to ensure its warfighters 
are delivered the advanced systems and equipment they need to perform their missions. 
The MK V SOC scenario presented earlier is an excellent case in point. Confronted with 
an unacceptable estimated first article delivery schedule of at least seven years, 
USSOCOM established the MK V SOC Program Office clearly out of necessity. 
Recognizing that the use of traditional acquisition techniques would slow down the 
process and result in a similarly unacceptable delivery schedule, the MK V SOC 
Program Office tailored the program and applied streamlined acquisition approaches that 
had never been attempted at USSOCOM. The success of this program paved the way 
for the establishment of the NSW RIB Program Office, which applied the lessons learned 
from the MK V to create an even more streamlined and successful program. 
The advantages noted previously which have enabled USSOCOM to successfully 
streamline its acquisition process are also the primary factors contributing to the areas 
identified as being non-compliant. Because ofUSSOCOM's size and the close proximity 
of decision makers, the level of oversight and review over the PEOs from the J5/7, the J8, 
and the MDAE, is much greater than what would exist if the organizations were 
established in separate locations. The disadvantages associated with the additional 
oversight and review by no means outweigh the advantages discussed in the previous 
paragraphs, but they clearly do not comply with the intent of acquisition reform 
initiatives involving the theme of empowerment. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the findings and analysis included m this thesis, the following 
recommendations are provided. 
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• To facilitate addressing the empowerment issue, the leadership within SOAC 
and the Directorates should determine which oversight and review practices 
they would eliminate if their organizations were not in such close proximity. 
Following this recommendation will encourage the senior leadership within 
USSOCOM to confront the challenges they would face if they were not within walking 
distance of each other. Because of the financial and logistical constraints of being in 
separate locations, something would have to change. This type of analysis will identify 
and eliminate unnecessary oversight and review procedures, enhancing the acquisition 
process at USSOCOM. 
• Allow PEOs the flexibility to manage their programs by granting them the 
authority to execute reprogrammings and realignments in accordance with 
legal thresholds (RDT&E, $3.99 million; Procurement, $9.99 million). 
Acceptance and incorporation of this recommendation would provide PEOs with a 
level of authority, which is currently restricted, commensurate with their responsibilities. 
• Develop a new charter for PEOs that more thoroughly describes their 
authority, responsibility, organizational relationships within USSOCOM and 
operating relationships with the Components and Services. 
Clarifying roles and responsibilities in a new charter would help to resolve both 
internal and external conflicts. Appendices (1) and (2) contain the charters for 
USSOCOM's Maritime and Rotary Wing PEO and NAVSEASYSCOM's Undersea 
Warfare PEO, respectively. This recommendation does not endorse the creation of 
identical NA VSEA and USSOCOM charters, but it does suggest that the existing 
USSOCOM charter could be improved by providing a level of guidance and direction 
similar to what is found in the Undersea Warfare PEO charter. 
• Create a Table of Organizational Equipment (TOE) for USSOCOM which 
specifies the equipment the Components are authorized and expected to have 
to accomplish their missions. 
This recommendation is provided by Mr. Bill Chadwick, the representative 
from JSOC referenced earlier in the chapter, and is geared towards resolving the 
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Component's perception that USSOCOM's RGS needs to be streamlined. By listing all 
of the equipment that USASOC, for example, is authorized to carry on a TOE, USASOC 
could simply submit an addendum to the original MNS/ORD if that item (e.g., night 
vision goggles) is on the TOE. This would save the time and resources associated with 
development of a MNS and ORD and contribute to a streamlined process. 
• Collect the top five recommendations from each ofUSSOCOM's acquisition 
personnel describing how USSOCOM could be doing a better job of 
incorporating acquisition reform initiatives into the process. Use those inputs 
to develop a top ten list which will serve as the agenda for a portion of the 
Acquisition Reform Stand Down scheduled for March 1997. 
The majority of the interviews conducted ended with this question. Examples of 
responses received, besides the subjects already discussed, included recommendations to 
work closer with Independent Operational Test and Evaluation Activities throughout the 
acquisition process, to keep more of the programs "in-house" and to change the 
requirement to conduct legal reviews for all procurements from over $100 thousand as it 
currently exists to over $500 thousand. By collecting the inputs prior to the March 1997 
Acquisition Reform Day and incorporating them into the agenda, the attendees are more 
apt to take a personnel interest in the discussion. 
D. RECOMMENDED THESIS TOPICS 
The following are suggested topics for further research in this area: 
• Document and analyze the challenges USSOCOM faces with Service-
managed programs. Compare and contrast successful and unsuccessful 
programs. 
• Determine the resources (financial and personnel) that would be required to 
create and maintain a Table of Organizational Equipment (TOE) for 




• Review USSOCOM' s Technology Development Programs to determine how 
effective they are at providing SOF personnel with the newest and best 
technology available. 
• Reviews USSOCOM's Program Management Allocation Criteria (PMAC) 
including the opinions and recommendations of USSOCOM, Component and 
Service acquisition representatives. 
• Conduct a case study of USSOCOM's Special Operations Forces Support 
Activity (SOFSA) and Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance 
(SETA) contracts which reviews the streamlined acquisition processes they 
incorporated and the advantages and disadvantages that were experienced. 
• Conduct a case study on the MK V SOC and NSW RIB which includes the 
history behind each program. Determine if NA VSEA would utilize the 
lessons learned from USSOCOM's program offices to manage future 
acquisition of a similar size and scope. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This final chapter has provided responses and analyzed the primary and secondary 
research questions presented in Chapter I, provided recommendations to correct processes 
which are not compliant with acquisition reform initiatives and listed potential thesis 
topics related to USSOCOM and acquisition reform. This chapter has shown that 
USSOCOM is at the forefront of implementing reform initiatives into the acquisition 
process and that the non-compliant areas which appear to exist can be resolved by 
reducing the level of oversight and review within the organization. 
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APPENDIX A. USSOCOM PEO CHARTER 
By direction of the President of the United States through National Security Decision 
Directive 219, and by my appointment as Special Operations Acquisition Executive, I 
hereby appoint 
Captain Bud Sawyer, USN 
as 
Program Executive Officer 
for 
Special Operations - Maritime and Rotary 
As Program Executive Officer, you will perform as the Special Operations centralized 
manager for assigned materiel acquisition programs. 
You will, as the responsible management official, provide executive direction, guidance 
and management for the development, acquisition, testing and fielding of Special 
Operations Forces programs. 
You will place primary management emphasis on cost estimating, planning, 
programming budgeting, program integration, interoperability and risk reduction. 
Unless sooner terminated, this appoint will be in effect as long as the Program Executive 
Officer is assigned. 
Signed 
Gary L. Smith 
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APPENDIX B. NAVSEASYSCOM PEO CHARTER 
CHARTER FOR THE 
PEO FOR UNDERSEA WARFARE 
Encl: li Programs Assis~e~ to PEO tor Under8Qu war%are 
2) Organizational Relationsh1ps 
3) PEO for Undersea Warfare Organizatio~ 
1. Purpose: Thi~ document covers the bacxgrcun~, seep~. 
authorities and reepon~ih111t1es, and operating ~c:atior.ships for 
t~e Pro~~~ ~e~uti~e Qfficer {PEO) for Undersea Wa=fare. 
2. Jac:ckcr;ougd: ?;he Secretuy of Defense app:ovea tl"li&il DQ~a:rt:."'len~ 
of the Navy (DON) pla~s for implenentation of ~he Defense 
Management Raport. and the Secretary of the ti~yy,, by me~randw~ 
dated 31 JaouarJ 1990, directed no~ tBplementation. The PEO !or 
surface Ship ASW Syst~ was established as part o! thi~ 
im?lenantaticn. In July 1992, a decision ~s implenented to 
realign functions betweeu the Na~al Se~ Systams Command (~AvSF.~) 
ana i~ affi1~ated PEOs an~ Direot reportin; P~ogr~m Ma~agers 
(DRPMs) and ~o fo~ the PEC for vndersa& ~arfare. !h1s d~cision 
was b•s~d on a desire to ea?1tal12e oo the potential synergy from 
the CQmhina~ion of all significant ~sw ana aDti-torpedo ~eapons 
under a eir:g~e mana;ex. The PEO for undersea Warfare replaced tt.e 
PEO for surface Ship ASW syst~s a~d consolidated other re1~tQd 
activities previously manag-~ by the JilF:C tor Su.bmari.oe combat and 
Weapons sys-.:.el!l.s a.nd NAVSEA. In 19 95 " dr.-cis; ion ~s 1nade to 
realign £unctioac between NAVSEA and its' at:iliated PEOs and 
DRPMs. This act:1on re.5ult.ed in the l'e&lign~ent of selec~e.d .~S'i1\ 
a~f=rts f~om NAVSEA to PEO(USW). Specifically the Surface AS~ 
systems Division was tran~fRrred to rEO{USW). P20(0SW) retains 
autherity !or those p%ograms ~a~sferred in July 1~92. 
SEC~AVI~S1 540~.15A of 26 V.ay 1995 provided recognition of 
CNO's ~espon~~ility fcr.3attera pertai~ins to in-servic~ ~upport 
by having tbe PEO 1 s report to the CNO thx:ongh COMNAVSEASYSCOH for 
these aspects cf their assiqned responsibilities. 
3. System Dft'SXiptioa; The PEO for Undersea Warf~re is 
responsible for ASW ba~dware and software components, 5ubsystems1 
a~d system$ involved 1r.: ta=ge~ surveillance. detection, 
clasaitioation, and loca.li.:;;ation; C.ata processing aDd displa3•; 
weapon eontrol and related ~o~putQ% subsystems; w~pon$, 
countermeasures, l~onchers, tub~s, unmanned {remote and tethered) 
underaea vehicle~, handling an~ stowa~e e~1ipment• related 
ccmmunication and command and cc~~ol: a~d suppor~ aud tr~in~nq 
equipment. 
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4. se2211 Tbe PEO fQr undersa~ warf~r~ 1s ~~signed liie cycle 
rPsponsibility and mana9ement accounLabili~~ ~or all delegated 
pro~zams. N•v programs ~ay b• assign~~ by ASN (RD&A). The cu~~ent 
pri~~ry pro9~ams are; 
a. Submarine Launohed ASW Weapons. includi~g torpedo HK 48 {in· 
aerviee and FMS), MK 48 ~DtAP, ana A~CAP ~ods 
b. Su.rfi!laa ana Air !.allilched ASW Weapor1s, i.ncl:.ldiog 
Torpedo MK 50 (~n·se~vice)l Torpedo MK 45 (in-service ~n~ 
FMS l and Li9htwQight Hybr;id. Torpedo and Vert:taal :Lau.nch 
ASROC {in-a~rvice) 
c. Nea~ and Long TQrm Y-lne Rc~ohnaissa~ce SystP.~s. MX ~o Mod 1 
ilD.d Mod 1 Targets~ and. MK 39 Expena.aole Mobile AS\~ Tra ini:-.tc 
Tarset. J 
d. Surface Sbip ASW Combat Systems. !ncl~din~ AN/SOQ-S~~V), 
AN/SOQ•34 Ca~rier ~SW Module. A~/SQS-SlA E~16, AN/SOS-56. 
AN/WQC-~ Aeoustic Communieatio~s, MK~ll6 UFCS and KINGF~5n~R 
e. US iilld Joi.nt US/UK St:rfa·ce .Ship Torpedo Defense sy~t_ens, 
i~cluding SLR•24, SLQ-25, MSTRAP a~d Laupched Expend~ble 
Aco~stic VErtice; 
£. Navy Si~nal ~~ocossor$ in~ludi~g, AN/OYS-lCV), ~~/0!5·2A(V) 
a~d Su~cessor COTS•based Systems 
q. subm.arine Reg;onal Warfare sya.eem includibg AH/WLY-1. awi 
exp~~d~Dle Mobile ~nd St~t~onary Count~rmeasures 
h. un~e~se• Wart~re Ad~aocea Systems and T~chnologies 
Funding l~e:.ntific:atiorl associated vi'th. these pro9'rams is 
ecntained in enclosure Cl). 
5. AUthoritita ane Rs&po~sibiljti~a: 
a. ~he PEO for u~d@rsea Watf~~c has ae~uisitLOO ~nd'iC-5Cr-wiCe 
~uppo~t res~onsibility and management acQountability for ~ll 
assi9~~~ proqrams. Thm PEO is ~e$pon~ible for a~surin9 that 
assig~ea programs a•~ eon~ucted within the techni~al~ fundin~. 
sehedule, and ~u~~ortabili~y constraints app~oved by the decision 
authority. The N~vy Acquisition Exec~tive (~AE) m~y dele~at~ 
mile~tone decisio~ author!ty to the P~O as ap~rop~~ate. 
b. Tne PEO bas ~hartering a~thc~i~y fg~ a5Si~~~d ?MS. ~he PEO 
vill vest PMs ~th the au~hority, accountabil~ty a~d ~esoure~s 
~e~~ssary to mana~a P~O app•oved pro~ram ~l~ns ~od budgets fc~ 
the 4evelcp~ent. pro~uetion. introduction ~n~ ~~·service su~po~t 
cf ~~p~gned s~sterns. The ~EO will keep the PM c~~rte1s ~urrent. 
c. Tne PEO will dirac~ al~ p~ogram activities financed u1 
o~erations and Maintecance; Research, Development. ~est ana 
Evalu~t1on; and P~ocuremen~ appropriation~ that are allocated by 
NAVCOMPT to ~h~ ~~VSEA Co~ptr~lle~ for ~me PEO. This 
responHibility inolUdQ~ ~oordinating with an~ pro~Lding 
di~eetion, as app~opri~tG. to ~ne NAVS~~ com~~roller for 
~llocatiog :tu1.aget i.C11UStments, aut.ho:r-:iiing .be~cw t.hra~hold 
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repro~rammioq~ CBTt) 4 ~e~oLv~ng f~nding issues, and prepari~q 
budget submissions, justification~ and r~cLamas. Nothing hcrcib 
supe%seces NAVSEA Compt~oller respoh$1biliti~s for appropriate 
admi~istration or funds incl~din9. b~t not limited to, revie•s 
for comp~i~nee with 31 usc 130~(~) wnd 3l ~se lSl7 anc i~ 
accordanee W1t~ ~AVCOMPlNS~ 7102.2C. 
d. ~rcqra~~~tically the PEO will •crvc as a focal ?oint for 
intensifi~d ~DageKent attention fo~ all ass~gne~ prQ9rams. T~e 
P~O vill ensure that the prog%am5 are pr~c~edir.s on a souu~ 
business and technical basis ar.d act as the PM's interface with 
the NAE. NA~SEA. and othe% ~r~anizat1o~s in maLLe~s othQr tha~ 
routil!e. 
e. The P!O will !ie:rv.e as the i:c.te;rati.nq ageDt cf the assigned 
P.Ms fer tunctional sup~ort. ~ne PEO ~il: ensuTe that 
st:anli.,rdizat.icm I C011lmO.ne.l1 ty r C:OD.figu:ration :rnana.qemer.t" ~ dAS i gn 
for lcqisties suppo~t. risk identifieatio~ aDd ~~igaciQn, 
~~tt1cal item testin; &Dd tcp level planoi~~ for &equisiti~n 
phase transi~ions, are a1l inco~por~~ed intc aad made an inrPgral 
part of ~1e develo~ment proce5S. 
r. Th~ ~EO is ~esponsible for al! neces~~ry ee~ti£~catio~ ~nd 
app~oval~ pertainin9 to assig~ed proqrams. ~is i~c1ude! 
ce~tifLca~1o~ of txecutability, Readiness !or OPEVAL. Logist~cs 
Readiness, ccnfi.qu::ra.ti.on Au<3its anr::l P'rodaot:ion :Reildinesl!: 
Coert.l :Ci.c:::a. tions, and a :.1 ,. i rn i.lar act ion.s . 'l'he PEO Will chair th(; 
A~quis~tio~ Kev1ew noaza for a~~i~ned ~roqT.~ms and w~l 
coordinate the development of ~est ~nd Evalua~io~ M~~tcr Plans. 
~he P~c w~~l e~sure S&fety Certifications are obtaihed 
~ecognizinq thE chartered NAVS!At NAVaia, IL~KCORP and otbcr 
SlSCOM responsibilities IOr submar~n~/s~r:a~e ~hip/air pJatror~s: 
explo5ives a~d diver safety. 
g. The P£0 i~ responsible for the d~velopment and app~o~al of 
~cquis~ticn Pl&~s acd an A=quisition Strategy fo~ 45~igned 
~rogr~s. !he PEO. ~n ~cordination with the NAVSEA Pxocur~ment 
Contrac~inq Cffio$r {PCO), is also responsib~e ~cr the 
dave~opment and execution of contractins strategies. Unless 
otherw~se spec1f1&~ by higher ~~~hQ~ity, tne PEO wi1l act a~ 
scuree Seleotion Authority [SSA) fo~ eontr~ct aw~rds fox ~11 
assigned pro9r1.ms. SSA. rea.eH~qa'tion wiJ.l be lu caccoro::lallc~ .. r; 1:.~ 
the applio~ble SECN~V iui~a~ee. 
h. The PEO bas responsibility 1or all per~cnnel in the PEO, 
including •ssigne~ PMs, as follows: 
(l) Militat"y- The P!O appl;Qves the as.signm4!!:1"t. of ~ll mil~ta=y 
personn~l to th~ PP.O and has fitness report re~pon~ibility for 
these indiv1duals. ~he PEO is respcnsLble !o~ trainin9 (inclcdinq 
ethiCs) an~ ~a~eer development. 
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(2) Civilian • Th~ PEO is re$pODsible for man6ging pexsonne1 
resources witj::a.in ass.i.qne~ manpowe.r c:cnt.rol.s;; a~1.d b.a..s the. I'&lated 
Cl~ssi~ication ~utho:it.y. The i~. or ceslgaated Iepresentat~uQ, 
is tha seleetic~ official fo~ oivilian ~ositions. ~he PEO ~s 
recpon~ible io~ performance ~p~~isals, merit pay, awards and 
honors, training (including E!th.lcs), a:n~ career deve~opneul. 
i. The PEO is the foc~l pciat fo~ Fcxeig~ lechnalogy Trans£er ~nd 
l:'oreign l!-lil.it.ary Sales (P~S} for all ~15~isned px-ogora.:ms. Qper~ti~3' 
under the guiden~e ann direction of th~ NAE. 
j. the PEO is respo~~ible foi sys+.ems integr~tion of a~signPd 
systems with op~rating platrorm£. 
k. The! PF.Cl is respon.sibl.e for administration of tne or;ar: iz:at1ur;. 
in~ludihg s~~~rity~ trav~l, internal working prccedures, ~o+kinq 
hours/ ov@rtime/compQns~tory t~, ~~d all sim~lar items. 
1. The PEO 1~ reBponsibLe ior ensuring that organiz~tlonal 
op~ratic~zJ fiscal 4~~· contr~ctual matters are ccnduc~ed wi~b 
intesrilY and the hiqhest etkies. 
m. The P~O wil~ exexeise techn~ca~ aecis~on au&hority Q~e% 
assigned programs, with technical as~istance provided by ~AV~EA. 
As requized, technical support may he proviQed by other SYS~o~s. 
n. The PEO will iointly develop plans with ~AVSEA a~d oth~ 
appropriat~ ~cmmand$ fer tha t•ansilion of prQqram~ i~tc and o~t 
of the PEO organizatlonal structure. 
o. ~he PEO is responsible to the CNO/CMC via CO~AVSF.~ for in-
service s~port of aisignAd prQsrams. 
6. K.elcu:,ipp5hip te J;haxt'=:t::in9 2\U't:boritx: The PIOO 'for 'IJnders:e.a 
~arf~re reports direetly to the ASN(RD~~). 
7. 0Jlerat1Dg J!!la't.i,phsbl-ps: Enclo&'.lre (2' depict& top lf!vel 
organizational relationships and is consi&tent with the 
provis~ons Qf S!CNAVINS~ 5400.15A. 
a_ ~[l!l<kD&A); 'l'he I?EO fc.r trnder,sea warf&.r@ reports dir.ec':..1~t to 
the NAE and is responsible to ~he ~AE for succestful ma~ageme~t 
of ~~sig~ed programs. Io discharging thi• responsibility, the ~~o 
~co~ina~es his •fforts with o~her ASN[RD6A) offices, 
b. CHIEF 0~ ~AVAL QP~RAT.CNS; Tbe Chief of Naval Operations 
(~~0) is xesponsiblc for e&t~blisbing military requirements. 
p1anning and. ccnduot.lr..g opera.t1o.c.al te.st autl ev!!iuar.ior:.. 
supporting the condtc.ot of aeveloprnent t.e.S't i!lrtd F!V"allla'tion r 
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formulating budget aud program ple~~ to~ SE~NAV ap~rov~l. ~n~ tor 
flaet support. The Pto will be re~ponsiv~ to CNO in the exerclee 
o! these rP.sponsibilities. CNO does not have dtreetive a•ltho.ri 'ty 
in ~a~earch, developm~nt, a~~ acquisition matters. 
e. li,AVSEA: HAVSE:."' is des·iqnateci as .tht! .s;uppc.rt SYSCOM fo:r t.he 
PiO tor Ur.der~ea wax-fare. The support 'that th.e PiO recei v~~ f'l·T:Jn: 
NAVSEA is deCiDed in a~ Operat~ng A;~ee~ant •isoed by the PEO and 
co~~VSBA a~d a~p~Qvea by ~~o ~AE. In brie[, all ale~ents of 
N~VSE~ wil1 provide suppoxt to the PEO in or~er for tbe PEO to 
successful:y execute the assiqned mi~sion. NAVSEA vill aet as the 
ho5t for tho PEO/PHe and the PEO v~ll be ~ollocatRd with NAVSE~ 
to enable optim~ vorkiog %elationsr.ips. A aesigBated eontrBcting 
orfic~r and le~al ~epresentative will sup~ort each major pJngr~n 
pe.r 't.h2 requiren;u.lts o:r a.:r;:pli~able coo ana SECN'l!I.V quidac<::e. 
~AVSEA's Warfar~ centers, and ~hP.re &ppro~riate Warfa~e c~~te~s 
under the canmand o: NAVAl~ or SPAWA~. will provide suppu:t LO 
the P~o and the assi9o~d Program ~aagers in uniq~ely assiqned 
mission and le~oership ~reas as p~eacribed in the~~ regpe~tiv~ 
Warf~re center cha~tezs. The PEO ~i1~ ~nsure that ~rl is 
~~ziqned to the dppropriate ~enter ba~ed on these m1ssio~ and 
Jeadership a~eas. 
d. Q~HEB pEo/DRPMs/SXSCOMs: ~he ?EO will coordinate ~it~ related 
prog~ams in ether P~O/DRPM/SYSCOM otf1ees that interface wit4 
assignaa systems and ensure ~at the ~ys~ems are proper1y 
ir.~egra~ed. ~he ~~o wi~l execute MOA& ~n this area. as necEssa~y. 
e. T:EPA..''H·1E"S+ OE' PEF'ENSE (POI>) AND CO~CBBSSIONj\L: 
i.c't.a::!"face wi. 't:r.: COD and Co:-19:!:"essiona.l Off .!.ce.S under 
a~thorlLYr and guidance ot ~h~ NAE =onsistent with 
a.nd guidance ~.rov.ided tly the O:ff::..c.fl! of Le9i..slative 
The PEO wi:l 
the Cli:rect:i.o:n .. 
SEC:N:..\" polic! 
P.f:tairs. 
B~ Staffing and O+ganization; Encl~sure (3) i.s the fEO for 
O~dersea Warfare orsanizaticn 
!'. tha'd:er Jeyicur; 'The PEC "Vi~l revie=w 'thi.& Charter all!lU.ally and 
will provide r~commenaat1ons for change ~a the N~. Enclosures 
(~l through (3} will be revised as re~uired to rer~~ct any 
sigaifieant program deletion~ cr additions durinq this review. 
~~• '~ ~111 a~&e pexiodically re~ie~ ar.d rev~se ChP. •Dat~ 
Sheats .. 1n the NAVSEI. IIaa.d.qua.:rte:E"~ Organlz.ati.onal Manual to-::- e.lch 
~f their s~bo~dinate ~roqra~ Managem~nt of:ices. 
10. Exee~IJone~ ~xecutivo Order 12344, statutory prescrib~d by 
P.L. 9S-S~5 (42 U.s.c. 7~SB, no~e), establishe~ the 
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r•spon5i~ilities a~d a~~hor1t1ee of.tha geputy cam.anaer, Nuc~eat 
Prcpulaion Directorate (S~ Q6) over all facilities an~ 
activitic& wbieh campr1s~ the P~ram~ a joint Departmen~ Qf 
Enerqy (DOE)/N~vy or9anizatign. ~n••• respo.nsi~ilities ~na 
au~norit~as include all technical and lC9istioal matta~s related 
~ naval nuclear propu1s~on. Rathin~ in thi$ Cb~t~ -~~ersedes 
or changes these ~espoftStbilities an authorities~ Aeeordinqly. 
t.bll Deputy COIIZI.nd~, liU~lear Propulsioll Dizu~tarate will :be 
a~n~ulted in all ~t~ers pertaining ta, cr a!re~tinq, nuclear 
propulsicn plants and as~oeia~ed nuclear suppQrt facilities. 
SUbmitted ~: 
' Prc~ra3 Execu orr1ca:. 
for Ondersaa Warfa~e 
CG~~~JRnde:r Kava 1 sea Systems Command 
Approved: 
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Acquisition Category 
Administrative Contracting Officer 
Assessment Director 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
Acquisition Executive 
Air Force Special Operations Command 
Acquisition Process Action Team 
Acquisition Program Baseline 
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations 
and Low Intensity Conflict) 
Acquisition Task Force 
Budget Analyst 
Board of Directors 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers 
and Information Systems 
Civil Affairs 
Cost as an Independent Variable 
Commerce Business Daily 
Capabilities Based Program List 
Competition in Contracting Act 
Command Oversight Review Board 
Commercial-off-the-Shelf 
Defense Acquisition Board 
Defense Acquisition Executive 
Defense Accounting Office 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
Directional Infrared Countermeasure 
Defense Management Review 
Department of Defense 
Developmental Testing 
Evolutionary Acquisition 
Executive Integrated Product Team 
Executive Quality Board 
Financial Analyst 
Federal Acquisition Computer Network 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
Fiscal Year 












































General Services Administration 
General Services Board of Contract Appeals 
Head of Contracting Authority 
Head of Agency 
Headquarters 
Integrated Logistics Support Plan 
Integrated Product Team 
Directorate of Personnel 
Directorate of Intelligence 
Directorate of Operations 
Directorate ofLogistics 
Directorate of Plans, Policy and Strategic 
Assessments 
Directorate of Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Information 
Systems 
Directorate of Resources 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
Joint Special Operations Command 
Life Cycle Cost 
Logistics Review Group 
Low Rate Initial Production 
Milestone Decision Authority 
Military Deputy to the Acquisition Executive 




Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request 
MK V Special Operations Craft 
Mission Needs Statement 
Memorandum of Agreement 
Memorandum of Policy 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Naval Special Warfare Command 
Non-Developmental Item 
National Performance Review 
Naval Special Warfare Rigid Inflatable Boat 
Naval Special Warfare 
Operations and Maintenance 
Operational Test and Evaluation Force 
Operational Requirements Document 













































PPBS Acquisition Management Information System 
Process Action Team 
Program Budgeting Accounting System 
Program Budget Decision 
Program Executive Officer 
Program-Integrated Product Team 
Program Manager 
Program Management Allocation Criteria 
Program Management Office 
Program Objective Memorandum 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting System 
Program Requirements Officer 
Program Specific Memorandum of Agreement 
Psychological Operations 
Resource Constrained Capabilities Based Program 
List 
Research, Development and Acquisition 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
Requirements Generation System 
Requirement-Integrated Product Team 
Requirements Review Board 
Service Acquisition Executive 
Systems Acquisition Manager 
SOAC Investment Division 
SOAC Policy Division 
SEAL Delivery Vehicle 
Sea-Air-Land 
Secretary of Defense 
Systems Engineering and Technical Assistance 
Special Operations Acquisition Board 
Special Operations Acquisition Center 
Special Operations Acquisition Executive 
Special Operations Forces 
Special Operations Forces Support Activity 
Special Operations Forces Tactical Assured 
Connectivity System 
Directorate of Procurement 
Special Operations Research, Development and 
Acquisition Center 
Senior Procurement Executive 
Strategic Planning Guidance 

















Strategic Planning Process 
Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities 
Truth in Negotiations Act 
Table of Organizational Equipment 
Total Quality Management 
Theater Special Operations Command 
United States Atlantic Command 
United States Army Special Operations Command 
United States Central Command 
Commander in Chief Special Operations Command 
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and 
Technology) 
United States European Command 
United States Pacific Command 
United States Special Operations Command 
United States Southern Command 
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